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 	 On	February	19th,	2012,	Casablanca’s	February	20th	Movement	(hereafter	referred	to	as	the	M20)	celebrated	its	first	anniversary	in	more	than	80	different	Moroccan	towns	and	cities.	One	year	previously,	following	a	call	posted	on	Facebook,	protests	had	sprung	up	 in	53	different	 locations	 throughout	 the	 country.1	During	 this	 interval	 of	 time,	 the	Moroccan	authorities	 took	measures	to	break	up	the	movement,	without	nevertheless	being	able	to	stop	the	protest.		 If	we	are	to	believe	both	the	national	and	international	official	discourse	touting	the	‘Moroccan	exception’,	the	monarchy	reacted	by	adopting	a	reformist	attitude,	which	prevented	both	popular	uprisings	as	well	as	a	revolution.	Initiated	in	the	1990s,	it	would	thus	seem	that	 the	country’s	 ‘democratization	process’	was	hastened	on	July	1st,	2011	with	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 new	 constitution,	 the	 organization	 of	 legislative	 elections	scheduled	 for	 November	 25th,	 2011	 and	 the	 nomination,	 on	 January	 3rd,	 2012,	 of	 a	government	 presided	 over	 by	 the	 Secretary-general	 of	 the	 Parti	 de	 la	 Justice	 et	 du	Développement2	(PJD	 -	Party	 of	 Justice	 and	Development),	 until	 then	 the	main	 Islamic	opposition	in	parliament.		 Several	 competing	 interpretations	 have	 been	 put	 forth	 to	 explain	 Morocco’s	trajectory	during	2011.	Some	have	highlighted	the	elements	that	make	Morocco	a	country	‘like	any	other’,	while	others	have	emphasized	its	uniqueness.	But	regardless	of	whether	these	 studies	 focus	 on	 revolutionary	 situations	 or	 the	 region’s	 ‘exceptionalism’,	 four	biases	consistently	reoccur.	First	of	all,	observers	tend	to	concentrate	on	the	‘causes’	and	‘results’	of	political	crises,	rather	than	on	protest	dynamics.3	Secondly,	when	attention	is	paid	to	the	actors	of	these	events,	it	tends	to	focus	on	outsiders,	embodied	by	archetypes	(depoliticized,	 disenfranchised	 youth,	 cyber-activists,	 etc.)	 and	 thus	 ignores	 the																																																									1	Morocco-wide,	the	police	estimated	37,000	protestors,	while	organizers	claimed	238,000.	The	mood	of	the	protests	was	largely	peaceful,	barring	a	few	incidents	in	a	handful	of	cities	(fires,	destruction	of	goods,	6	dead	and	128	wounded,	including	115	police	officers,	and	120	arrests,	according	to	the	Minister	of	the	Interior).		2	See	Table	1	and	Khadija	Mohsen-Finan,	Malika	Zeghal,	‘Opposition	islamiste	et	pouvoir	monarchique	au	Maroc.	 Le	 cas	 du	 Parti	 de	 la	 Justice	 et	 du	 Développement’,	Revue	 française	 de	 science	politique,	 56(1),	February	2006,	p.	79–119.	3	For	a	historical	point	of	view,	see	François	Furet,	Penser	la	Révolution	française,	Paris,	Gallimard,	1978;	for	 a	 political	 science	 perspective,	 see	 Michel	 Dobry,	 Sociologie	 des	 crises	 politiques,	 Paris,	 Presses	 de	Sciences	Po,	3rd	ed.,	2009.	
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heterogeneous	makeup	of	the	groups	in	question.	In	addition,	these	actors	are	observed	and	fixed	at	t	time	—	an	approach	which	neglects	the	indirect	paths	that	lead	individuals	to	protest,	to	increase	their	commitment,	to	convert	their	activist	engagement,	or	on	the	contrary,	to	disengage.	Finally,	the	boundaries	between	civil	society	and	institutionalized	politics,	 as	 well	 as	 those	 between	 social	 movements	 and	 conventional	 politics	 often	become	rigid	and	 inflexible.4	This	 translates	 into	a	 failure	 to	address	 the	processes	of	interpenetration	 between	 arenas,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 formation,	 reconfiguration	 and	disintegration	of	coalitions	during	political	crises.5			 In	this	essay,	we	will	instead	focus	on	one	main	question:	how	is	a	field	of	alliances	and	 oppositions	 configured	 in	 relation	 to	 external	 events,	 and	 is	 it	 then	 constantly	reshaped	throughout	the	unfolding	of	a	protest	movement?	Following	in	the	footsteps	of	other	theoretical	approaches,6	by	field	of	alliances	and	oppositions	we	mean	interaction	networks	 that	 are:	 more	 or	 less	 stable	 over	 time;	 characterized	 by	 more	 or	 less	formalized 7 	relationships	 based	 on	 mutual	 acquaintance	 and	 close	 ties	 and	 on	 the	sharing,	 in	 the	 short-	 or	 long-term,	 of	 the	 same	 values,	 causes,	 enemies,	 participants,	audiences	and	resources.	This	approach	allows	us	to	connect	the	meso	level	of	(more	of	less)	 organized	 groupings	 and	 the	 micro	 level	 of	 individuals,	 whether	 they	 are	‘newcomers’	or	multi-positioned	actors,	having	already	belonged	 to	or	participated	 in	informal	 groups,	 Facebook	 debates,	 associations,	 unions,	 political	 parties,	 etc.,	 either	synchronically	 or	 diachronically.	 This	 methodology	 also	 allows	 us	 to	 go	 beyond	organizational	 bias,8	and	 thus	 to	 re-establish	 the	 variety	 of	 organizational	 forms,	 the	diversity	 of	 actors	 who	 are	 ‘participants’	 rather	 than	 ‘members’,	 to	 comprehend	 the	dynamic	nature	of	‘changing	configurations	of	alliances’9	and	to	surpass	the	boundaries																																																									4 	For	 a	 critique	 of	 this	 problem,	 see	 Jack	 A.	 Goldstone,	 ‘Introduction.	 Bridging	 Institutionalized	 and	Noninstitutionalized	Politics’,	in	Jack	A.	Goldstone	(ed.),	States,	Parties,	and	Social	Movements,	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003,	p.	1–24.	5	For	example,	Suzanne	Staggenborg,	 ‘Coalition	Work	in	the	Pro-Choice	Movement’,	Social	Problems,	33,	1986,	p.	374–389. 6	This	concept	draws	on	the	notion	of	the	multi-organizational	field	(Russell	L.	Curtis,	Louis	A.	Zurcher,	‘Stable	Resources	of	Protest	Movements:	The	Multi-Organisational	Field’,	Social	Forces,	52(1),	1973,	p.	53–61).	 Its	 development	 relies	 upon	 its	 connection	with	 other	 concepts	 (cf.	 notes	 below)	 and	 reflections	conducted	with	Olivier	Fillieule.	7	See	 Frédéric	 Sawicki’s	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘socio-political	 environment’	 (‘Partis	 politiques	 et	mouvements	sociaux’,	 in	Simon	Luck,	Stéphanie	Dechezelles	 (ed.),	Voix	de	 la	 rue	ou	voie	des	urnes	 ?,	Rennes,	Presses	Universitaires	de	Rennes,	2011,	p.	31–46). 8	Pamela	E.	Oliver,	 ‘Bringing	the	Crowd	Back	In:	The	Nonorganizational	Elements	of	Social	Movements’,	
Research	in	Social	Movements,	Conflicts,	and	Change,	11,	1989,	p.	1–30.	9	See	the	concept	of	‘social	movements	organizations’	coined	by	Olivier	Fillieule	(‘De	l'objet	de	la	définition	à	 la	définition	de	l'objet.	De	quoi	traite	finalement	la	sociologie	des	mouvements	sociaux	?’,	Politique	et	
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usually	 erected	 between	 social	 movements,	 partisan	 or	 union	 organizations	 and	‘infrapolitical’	groups.		 We	 shall	 attempt	 to	 answer	 this	 central	 question	 based	 on	 our	 ethnographic	observation	of	the	M20’s	organization,	conducted	in	Casablanca	between	February	2011	and	February	2012.	Following	several	calls	to	action	posted	on	Facebook,	the	M20	was	structured	around	a	collection	of	demands,	a	pacifist	attitude	and	a	schedule	of	protest	activities.	 This	 multi-situated	 movement	 was	 presented	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 a	decentralized	national	coordination,	characterized	by	‘weak	ties’:10	it	grouped	together	organizations	 that	were	 strongly	permeated	by	 the	 local	 circumstances	 in	which	 they	were	embedded.	In	the	wake	of	the	M20,	protest	actions	sprung	up	all	over	the	Web	as	well	as	in	the	streets.	We	have	chosen	to	focus	on	Casablanca,	Morocco’s	economic	capital	and	 the	 country’s	 largest	 city,	 as	 it	 has	 also	 inherited	 a	 long	 protest	 history	 that	 is	inscribed	 in	 the	memory	of	 its	 inhabitants.11	In	addition,	 the	majority	of	 the	 country’s	elites	are	located	in	Casablanca	or	Rabat.	More	importantly,	the	fact	that	we	had	already	spent	time	in	the	field	there	prompted	us	to	conduct	several	immersions	between	April	2011	and	February	2012,	lasting	anywhere	between	three	days	and	one	month.12		
 
Investigation Protocol 
The investigation protocol implemented followed three main criteria. Firstly, 
it seemed crucial to us to multiply the number of observational situations, both 
synchronically and diachronically, in order to comprehend protest dynamics in 
their density as well as their movement. Secondly, we wished to give ourselves 
the means to perceive the effects of these dynamics on participants as well as 
on the collective. Thirdly, we were careful to diversify the modes of data 
collection and analysis in order to reduce the biases engendered by the use of 
a single method. We ran two focus groups to deepen our understanding of the 
M20’s genesis in Casablanca. During each immersion session, we observed 
protest actions, general assemblies and related events; we socialized with 
members of the coordinating committee; we conducted in-depth interviews 
with 103 individuals (M20 participants, national political players, observers, 
authority figures); we additionally followed several individuals more closely, 
with whom we repeated interviews. During marches and demonstrations, we 
collected leaflets, recorded slogans, conducted short interviews and took 
photos. By methodically archiving part of the exchanges between M20 																																																								
Sociétés,	28(1),	2009,	p.	15–36,	here	p.	25ff.). 10	Mark	S.	Granovetter,	‘The	Strength	of	Weak	Ties’,	American	Journal	of	Sociology,	78,	1973,	p.	1360–1380.	11	The	uprisings	in	both	1965	and	1981	were	violently	repressed	and	turned	into	bloodbaths. 12	M.	Bennani-Chraïbi	conducted	seven	immersion	episodes	(April,	July,	September,	November,	December	2011,	 January	 and	 February	 2012).	 M.	 Jeghllaly	 conducted	 five	 immersion	 episodes	 (May,	 August,	December	2011,	January	and	February	2012).	
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members on Facebook, we expanded our fieldwork onto the Internet. Finally, 
we created a press kit, which included press releases and official positions 
taken by large associations, trade unions, Moroccan political parties and 
international actors and organizations. 
 In order to establish the sequence of protest dynamics, we conducted 
a thorough analysis of our data and formed a chronological timeline of about 
forty pages. This timeline documents the M20’s various actions in Casablanca 
over the course of twelve months; how the group was shaped and reshaped; 
new support and defections at the national level, the responses of the 
authorities, regional events seen (according to our interviewees) as favorable 
or unfavorable to the M20, as well as international support for the M20 or, on 
the contrary, for the monarchy. 
 Working as a two-person team allowed us not only to collect a rich 
variety of data, but also to nuance our observations and establish different 
relationships with survey participants. In fact, being able to present ourselves 
as a Berber-speaking young scholar, socialized in a Casablanca university, or as 
a forty-something female embedded in the European academic world, 
respectively, helped to shape our individual ‘games of distance and 
proximity’.13 
 
 On	 the	 basis	 of	 our	 observations,	 we	would	 like	 to	 put	 forth	 two	 hypotheses.	Firstly,	 it	 is	 when	 actors	 perceive	 ‘a	 situation	 of	 political	 fluidity’	 that	 they	 may	provisionally	put	aside	social	cleavages	in	order	to	express	shared	demands	that	are	un-ideological	and	largely	un-prioritized,	and	to	concentrate	on	the	 implementation	of	an	‘organization	on	the	ground’	(tansiq	maydani).	Secondly,	in	relation	with	the	intersecting	perceptions	which	 play	 out	on	 the	 regional	 and	 international	 levels,	 tension	 between	protest	 space	 and	 the	 stage	 of	 institutionalized	 politics14	helped	 to	 reshape	 the	M20	coalition,	as	well	as	protest	dynamics	in	general.	Starting	with	these	hypotheses,	we	shall	first	describe	the	environment	within	which	such	an	improbable	coalition	was	formed.	We	will	then	show	that	this	large	protest	movement	was	not	the	result	of	a	domino	effect,	nor	was	it	spontaneously	generated:	quite	on	the	contrary,	observing	the	genesis	of	the	M20	 movement	 revealed	 the	 diversity	 of	 its	 birthplaces,	 the	 interweaving	 of	 ‘non-relational’ 15 	mediations,	 both	 informal	 and	 organized,	 the	 synergies	 between	 new	participants	and	seasoned	activists.	Finally,	we	shall	focus	on	two	processes:	firstly,	the																																																									13 	Stéphane	 Beaud,	 ‘L'usage	 de	 l'entretien	 en	 sciences	 sociales.	 Plaidoyer	 pour	 l'“entretien	ethnographique”’,	Politix,	9(35),	1996,	p.	226–257,	here	p.	243. 14	By	institutional	political	sphere	we	mean	the	sites	of	conventional	politics	on	both	the	local	and	national	level,	as	well	as	all	the	actors	admitted	within	these	spaces	and	whose	participations	is	governed	by	law.		15	On	‘non-relational	means	of	diffusion’,	not	founded	on	direct	links	and	which	favor	the	process	of	the	‘attribution	 of	 similarity’,	 see	 the	 psycho-sociological	 approach	 in	 David	 Strang,	 John	 W.	 Meyer,	‘Institutional	Conditions	for	Diffusion’,	Theory	and	Society,	22(4),	1993,	p.	487–511.	
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process	that	underpinned	the	anchoring	of	the	M20	coalition	and	the	spread	of	protests	within	a	field	of	alliances	and	oppositions	and	secondly,	the	process	which	prompted	the	coalition’s	 reconfiguration	 and	 eventual	 disintegration.	We	 shall	 defend	 the	 following	thesis:	these	two	processes	do	not	automatically	follow	each	other	but	are	intertwined	in	a	‘game	of	levels’	between	local,	national,	regional	and	international	scales.		
THE	 M20:	 AT	 THE	 INTERSECTION	 BETWEEN	 PROTEST	 SPACE	 AND	
INSTITUTIONAL	POLITICAL	SPHERE	
		 If	we	were	to	refer	to	certain	theses	on	authoritarianism	and	coalition	formation	in	 the	 Third	World,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	Moroccan	 regime	 would	 not	 appear	 to	 exhibit	structural	characteristics	favorable	to	revolutionary	uprisings.	Compared	to	‘exclusive’,	‘interventionist’	or	 ‘repressive’16	regimes,	Morocco	would	thus	seem	to	exist	 in	a	 ‘grey	zone’.17	Endowed	with	certain	democratic	attributes,	the	Moroccan	regime	nevertheless	remains	plagued	by	the	‘syndromes’	of	‘irresponsible	pluralism’	or	a	‘dominant	political	power’	which	translate,	among	other	things,	into	a	break	between	those	governing	and	those	governed,	as	well	as	the	general	apathy	of	the	latter	with	regard	to	institutionalized	politics	and	its	elites.	On	another	level,	the	traits	of	the	country’s	protest	spaces	would	seem	to	present	obstacles	towards	the	spread	of	revolutionary	fervor.	The	fact	that	part	of	the	opposition	could	hope	to	have	even	limited	access	to	state-run	institutions	would	have	thwarted	such	an	impetus.	Moreover,	according	to	M.	Parsa,	the	presence	of	strongly	ideological	 and	 overly	 organized	 challengers	 incited	 such	 fears	 that	 it	 prevented	 the	formation	of	interclass	coalitions,	especially	among	the	upper	classes.	Nevertheless,	the	Moroccan	monarchy	tried	to	reorient	the	opposition	towards	institutionalized	politics,	while	 some	 protestors	 worried	 about	 ideological	 polarization	 and	 organizational	imbalances	between	the	stronger	Islamist	groups	and	a	weakly	anchored	Left.	It	remains	to	be	seen	how	actors	were	able	to	form	a	coalition	sufficiently	large	enough	to	challenge	‘despotism’	and	‘corruption’	in	a	context	which	presented	so	many	obstacles.		
Institutionalized	Politics	in	Morocco:	Between	Fragmentation	and	Renewal																																																									16	Misagh	Parsa,	States,	Ideologies	&	Social	Revolutions.	A	Comparative	Analysis	of	Iran,	Nicaragua	and	the	
Philippines,	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2000.	17	Thomas	Carothers,	‘The	End	of	the	Transition	Paradigm’,	Journal	of	Democracy,	1,	2002,	p.	5–21. 
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	 The	Moroccan	monarchy	has	often	 been	 presented	 as	 an	 ‘expert	 in	 survival’,18	enduring	the	vicissitudes	of	time	by	adapting	to	the	transformations	of	its	environment	and	observing	its	neighbors’	mistakes	in	order	to	better	predict	the	future.	Thanks	to	a	‘Makhzenian’19	strategy,	the	regime	would	thus	have	guaranteed	the	constant	renewal	of	reformist	discourse20	as	well	as	of	client	networks.	According	to	this	view,	it	would	also	have	demonstrated	the	ability	to	‘divide	in	order	to	better	rule’,	to	transform	‘opponents	to	His	Majesty’	into	‘opponents	of	His	Majesty’,	even	at	times	into	‘friends	of	the	king’.	As	the	political	scene	was	characterized	by	‘a	glut	of	players’,21	the	recourse	to	repression	was	selective	and	isolated.		 As	 soon	 as	 independence	 was	 proclaimed	 in	 1956,	 one	 of	 the	 monarchy’s	objectives	 was	 to	 fragment	 the	 polarized	 political	 climate	 by	 favoring	 divisions	 and	encouraging	the	birth	of	so-called	‘administrative’	parties.22	Consequently,	the	country’s	multi-party	 system	 and	 electoral	mechanisms	were	 thought	 to	 be	 the	 ‘political	 class’	instrument[s]	 of	 control	 used	 to	 confine	 potential	 rivals’.23	Indeed,	 after	 having	 been	allies	in	the	fight	for	national	independence,	the	monarchy	and	the	Mouvement	national	(National	Movement)	 quickly	 became	 rivals.	 Starting	 in	 the	mid-1960s,	 revolutionary	fervor	grew	within	the	ranks	of	the	Left	and	anti-monarchism	took	the	shape	of	urban	riots	(1965),	as	well	as	guerrilla	attacks	and	attempted	military	coups	(1971,	1972).	This	marked	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 ‘Years	 of	 Lead’,	 a	 period	 of	 wide-scale	 repression.	Negotiations	 between	 the	 monarchy	 and	 the	 left	 wing	 of	 the	 Mouvement	 national	nevertheless	continued,	and	the	mobilization	of	the	nationalist	repertoire	—	prompted	by	 conflict	 in	 the	 Western	 Sahara	 (1975)	 —	 marked	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 regime’s	stabilization	and	of	the	country’s	alleged	process	of	democratization.	The	recognition	of	the	king’s	hegemony,	of	Moroccan	ownership	of	the	Sahara	and	of	Islam	as	the	exclusive																																																									18	Lisa	Anderson,	‘Dynasts	and	Nationalists:	Why	Monarchies	Survive’	in	Joseph	Kostiner	(ed.),	Middle	East	
Monarchies.	The	Challenge	of	Modernity,	Boulder,	Lynne	Rienner,	2000,	p.	53–69.	19	In	Morocco,	the	term	Makhzen	designates	the	Royal	House,	the	territory	over	which	it	holds	power	as	well	as	its	administrative	branches.	‘Makhzenization’	thus	signifies	the	cooptation	by	the	‘Makhzen’,	or	the	permeation	of	its	spirit	and	style.			20	In	particular,	see	Myriam	Catusse,	‘Maroc	:	un	fragile	État	social	dans	la	réforme	néolibérale’,	in	Myriam	Catusse,	 Blandine	 Destremau,	 Éric	 Verdier	 (ed.),	 L'État	 face	 aux	 ‘débordements’	 du	 social	 au	Maghreb.	
Formation,	travail,	protection,	Paris,	Karthala,	2010,	p.	121–148.	21	Abdellah	Tourabi,	Lamia	Zaki,	‘Maroc	:	une	révolution	royale	?’,	Mouvements,	66,	2011,	p.	98–103;	Lofti	Chawqui,	‘Le	mouvement	du	20	février	un	an	après’,	Centre	Tricontinental	(CETRI),	February	2nd,	2012:	<http://www.cetri.be/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=2506>.	22	Rémy	Leveau,	Le	fellah	marocain	défenseur	du	trône,	Paris,	Presses	de	Sciences	Po,	1985	(1st	ed.	1976). 23	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	 ‘“Hommes	d'affaires”	 versus	 “profs	 de	 fac”.	 La	 notabilisation	 parlementaire	d'un	parti	de	militants	au	Maroc’,	Revue	internationale	de	politique	comparée,	15(2),	2008,	p.	205–219,	here	p.	206.	
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domain	 of	 the	 Commander	 of	 the	 Faithful	 erected	 boundaries	 between	 the	 legal	opposition,	represented	by	the	Union	socialiste	des	 forces	populaires	(USFP	-	Socialist	
Union	of	Popular	Forces),24	and	on	the	other	hand,	movements	mired	 in	 illegality	(first	Marxist-	and	then	Islamist-leaning	groups).		 After	 a	 decade	 plagued	 by	 structural	 adjustment	 programs	 and	 urban	 revolts	(1981,	1984,	1990),	overlaid	on	a	backdrop	of	promises	of	democratization	in	Tunisia	(1987)	and	Algeria	(1988),	 the	Gulf	War	(1991)	presented	an	 intense	challenge	to	the	Moroccan	king.	However,	at	a	moment	of	such	disillusionment,	it	would	appear	that	the	failures	of	Morocco’s	neighbor	Algeria	prompted	the	country’s	various	political	players	to	exercise	self-limitation.	In	a	context	where	both	the	monarchy	and	the	descendants	of	the	Mouvement	national	feared	the	rise	of	Islamism,	political	openness	meant	resuming	negotiations	between	the	two	camps	and	the	gradual	liberation	of	victims	from	the	Years	of	 Lead.	 Among	 the	 latter,	 many	 helped	 to	 give	 new	 momentum	 to	 associative	organizations	and/or	 joined	radical	 left-wing	groups	as	 the	 latter	became	increasingly	legalized.25		 Regardless	 of	 the	 theoretical	 approach	 adopted	 by	 different	 scholars,	 the	‘consensual	 alternating	 of	 government’	 (1998)	 and	 the	monarchy’s	 succession	 (1999)	have	generally	always	been	seen	as	turning	points	in	the	country’s	history,26	marked	by	the	 following	events:	 the	partial	 integration	of	Islamists	within	the	parliament	(1997),	the	 relative	 freedom	 of	 the	 press	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Equity	 and	 Reconciliation	Commission	 (2004–06),	 in	 the	 hopes	 of	 turning	 the	 page	 on	 the	 Years	 of	 Lead.	Nevertheless,	 following	 the	 attacks	 on	May	 16th,	 2003,	 the	 authorities	 resumed	 their	repressive	practices	and	reined	in	the	media.	Since	1998,	the	number	of	parties	on	the	legal	political	scene	has	multiplied.27	Little	by	little,	electoral	engineering	replaced	ballot-box	 stuffing:	 no	 political	 party	 obtained	 more	 than	 11%	 of	 the	 votes	 during	 2007’s	legislative	elections,	and	the	rate	of	abstention	reached	a	all-time	high	of	63%.	Coalition	
																																																								24	See	Table	1.	25 	Éric	 Cheynis,	 ‘L'espace	 des	 transformations	 de	 l'action	 associative	 au	 Maroc.	 Réforme	 de	 l'action	publique,	 investissements	 militants	 et	 légitimation	 internationale’,	 doctoral	 dissertation	 in	 the	 social	sciences,	Paris,	Université	Paris	I-Panthéon	Sorbonne,	2008.	26	Myriam	 Catusse,	 Frédéric	 Vairel,	 ‘Ni	 tout	 à	 fait	 le	même,	 ni	 tout	 à	 fait	 un	 autre.	Métamorphoses	 et	continuité	du	régime	marocain’,	Maghreb-Machrek,	175,	2003,	p.	73–92.	27 	This	 tendency	 also	 translated	 into	 a	 growth	 in	 the	 number	 of	 parties	 represented	 in	 the	 house	 of	representatives:	3	in	1963;	6	in	1977;	8	in	1984;	11	in	1993;	15	in	1997;	21	in	2002;	24	in	2007.	
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governments	with	hazy	prerogatives	brought	together	technocrats,	former	ministers	of	the	Mouvement	national	and	members	of	the	former	‘administrative’	parties.		 In	 2008,	 the	 Parti	 authenticité	 et	 modernité	 (PAM	 -	 Party	 of	 Authenticity	 and	
Modernity)	was	founded,	officially	with	the	objective	of	reconciling	citizens	with	politics	by	bringing	together	the	kingdom’s	key	players	—	and	unofficially,	to	combat	the	rise	of	Islamism.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 party	 was	 co-founded	 by	 a	 ‘friend	 of	 the	 king’,	 a	 former	secretary	of	state,	in	addition	to	its	meteoric	rise	in	the	polls	and	its	appeal	to	the	elected	members	of	 former	administrative	parties	all	worked	against	 the	coalition.	The	PAM’s	adversaries	criticized	it	for	just	being	a	new	‘administrative	party’	whose	mission	was	to	put	the	finishing	touches	on	the	lock-down	of	the	institutional	political	stage.		 It	is	on	this	backdrop	that	the	protest	dynamics	instigated	by	the	M20	emerged,	blurring	the	lines	between	institutionalized	politics	and	protest	space.		
February	20th:	The	Meeting	of	a	Motley	Crew	of	Players	
	 The	first	M20	demonstrations	took	place	on	February	20th,	2011	all	throughout	the	 country	 and	 marked	 an	 unprecedented	 threshold	 in	 the	 protest	 history	 of	independent	Morocco.	They	brought	together	new	players	as	well	as	individuals	who	had	witnessed	 the	 Years	 of	 Lead,	 civil	 society	 actors,	 members	 of	 governing	 parties	 and	parliamentary	opposition,	as	well	as	activists	from	illegal	organizations.	Over	the	course	of	the	past	twenty	years,	the	streets	have	almost	continuously	witnessed	demonstrations	and	 these	 protest	 spaces	 have	 become	 denser,	 especially	 in	 small	 and	medium-sized	towns.	In	1991,	unemployed	college	graduates	with	all	sorts	of	political	affiliations	(left-wing,	extreme	left-wing,	right-wing,	Islamist...)	chose	not	to	fight	each	other	but	rather	to	build	a	common	cause	around	the	right	to	work,	thus	beginning	a	cycle	of	demonstrations	which	 lasted	 by	 being	 regularly	 reconfigured.28	Similarly,	 during	 the	 2000s	 ‘Arab’	 or	‘Islamic’	 causes	 enabled	 the	 formation	 of	 coalitions	 bridging	 ideological	 differences.	During	the	last	few	years,	organizations	against	the	high	cost	of	living	brought	together	civil	 society	 members,	 union	 activists	 and	 left-	 and	 extreme	 left-wing	 militants.	Nevertheless,	this	was	the	first	time	that	an	attempt	to	go	beyond	the	fragmentation	of	Morocco’s	political	sphere	was	embedded	within	national	policy:	this	excluded	neither	
																																																								28	Montserrat	Emperador	Badimon,	‘Les	mobilisations	des	diplômés	chômeurs	au	Maroc	:	usages	et	avatars	d'une	 protestation	 pragmatique’,	 doctoral	 dissertation	 in	 political	 science,	 Aix-en-Provence,	 Institut	d'études	politiques,	September	2011.	
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an	overlap	with	social	demands	nor	connections	between	the	transnational,	national	and	local	levels.			 In	 fact,	 a	 seemingly	 unlikely	 relationship	 was	 established	 between	 two	 very	different	political	networks:	the	Left	and	the	Islamists.	For	these	two	groups,	protesting	together	meant	—	at	 least	 temporarily	—	putting	on	the	backburner	the	enmities	and	distrust	present	in	both	camps	and	which	opposed	‘adherents’	and	‘independents’,	those	integrated	within	organizations	of	 institutionalized	politics	 and	 those	marginalized	or	excluded	(Table	1),	not	to	mention	the	fracture	lines	running	through	parties	divided	by	their	past	and	present.			
Table	1.	Political	Organizations	Affected	by	or	Involved	in	the	M20	
	
Political	organizations	affected	by	the	M20	Governmental	Left	 Union	socialiste	des	forces	populaires	(USFP	-	Socialist	
Union	of	Popular	
Forces)																						
Born	of	a	scission	within	the	Mouvement	national	in	1959,	and	of	subsequent	split	in	1975,	the	USFP	embodied	left-wing	opposition	in	parliament	until	1997.	Within	the	context	of	the	Koutla	(a	coalition	formed	with	the	descendants	of	the	Mouvement	national),	it	became	a	governing	party	between	1998	and	2011.	Its	history	is	littered	with	divisions.	
In	first	position	during	the	legislative	elections	in	1997	and	2002,	it	slipped	to	fifth	position	in	number	of	seats	in	2007	(38).	Almost	40,000	members	declared.																
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Parti	du	progrès	et	du	socialisme	(PPS	-	Progress	
and	Socialism	
Party)	
Is	affiliated	with	the	Communist	Party	of	Morocco	founded	in	1944.	In	the	
Koutla,	it	became	a	governing	party	in	1998.	
17	seats	in	Parliament	in	2007.	Almost	40,000	members	declared.	
Parliamentary	opposition	 Parti	de	la	justice	et	du	développement	(PJD	–	Party	of	
Justice	and	
Development)	
Islamist-leaning	party	created	in	1998,	after	a	long	process	of	unification	and	legalization.	It	represented	the	main	opposition	in	Parliament	until	2011.	
46	seats	in	Parliament	in	2007.	Almost	16,000	members	declared.	
Political	organizations	which	support	the	M20	Legal	opposition,	both	parliamentary	and	non-parliamentary			Rassemblement	de	la	gauche	démocratique	(2004-	Democratic	Left	Coalition)	
Parliamentary	opposition			Alliance	de	la	gauche	démocratique	(2007	-	Democratic	Left	Alliance)	
Parti	socialiste	unifié	(PSU	-	Unified	Socialist	Party)									
Created	in	2005	following	the	unification	of	non-governing	left-wing	parties.	Its	roots	can	be	found	in	the	Mouvement	national	and	the	Marxist	movements	of	the	1970s.		
6	 seats	 in	Parliament	in	2007.	PSU:	 almost	 4,000	members	declared.	PADS:	 almost	 1,100	members	declared.	CNI:	 Information	not	available.	
Parti	de	l’avant-garde	démocratique	socialiste	(PADS-	Party	of	
the	Socialist	
Democratic	
Avant-garde)		
Result	of	a	split	from	the	USFP	in	1983,	legalized	in	1993.	
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Congrès	national	Ittihadi	(CNI	-	Ittihadi	
National	
Congress)	
Result	of	a	split	in	2001	from	part	of	the	union	branch	of	the	UFSP	(Confédération	démocratique	du	travail,	CDT	-	Democratic	
Confederation	
of	Labor)		 Legal	non-parliamentary	opposition		Annahj	Addimocrati	
Created	in	1995	and	legalized	in	2004,	this	party	claims	to	belong	to	Ila	Al	Amam,	a	Marxist-Leninist	movement	from	the	1970s.	
Has	a	history	of	boycotting	elections.	Almost	1,000	members	declared.	
Political	organizations	not	recognized	by	the	authorities	
Islamists				
Al	Adl	Wal	Ihsane	
(Justice	and	
Spirituality)	
One	of	the	main	Islamist	organizations	in	Morocco,	founded	in	the	mid-1970s.	It	is	characterized	by	its	non-recognition	of	the	king’s	status	as	the	Commander	of	the	Faithful	and	by	the	importance	it	attaches	to	spiritual	education.	Al	Badil	Al	Hadari	
(Civilizational	
Alternative)	
These	parties	stem	from	the	same	Islamist	fabric	of	the	1970s	as	the	PJD	and	proclaim	to	be	‘Islamo-democratic’	and	close	to	the	Left.	The	first	was	legalized	in	2005	and	dissolved	in	2008	following	accusations	of	terrorism.	The	second	did	not	become	official	until	2012.		
Hizb	Al	Oumma	(The	Party	of	
Oumma)	Extreme	left-wing	 Maoists	 	
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Trotskyists	(Almounadil-a)	 Present	largely	only	on	the	campuses	of	several	universities.	Stalinists			
Table	2.	Main	Affiliations	of	the	‘Left-Wing’	Pioneers	of	the	M20-Casablanca	Association	marocaine	des	droits	humains	(AMDH	-	Moroccan	Association	
for	Human	Rights)	 Created	in	1979	under	the	scope	of	the	UFSP.	After	a	standby	period,	in	1988	it	experienced	a	rebirth	thanks	to	the	arrival	of	radical	left-wing	activists.	In	2009,	it	had	91	local	chapters	and	more	than	10,000	members	throughout	the	country.	Association	nationale	des	diplômés	chômeurs	du	Maroc	(ANDCM	-	Moroccan	National	Association	
of	Unemployed	Graduates)	
Created	in	1991,	this	association	has	over	a	hundred	local	chapters.	Claiming	to	be	‘progressive,	independent,	popular	and	democratic’,	its	demonstrations	have	helped	to	normalize	the	occupation	of	the	streets	in	Morocco.	The	Casablanca	chapter	was	reactivated	in	2010	and	led	by	extreme	left-wing	militants	(Stalinists,	Maoists,	etc.).		Association	pour	la	taxation	des	transactions	financières	et	pour	l’action	citoyenne	–	Comité	pour	l’annulation	de	la	dette	du	tiers-monde-Maroc	(ATTAC-	
Association	for	a	Tax	on	Financial	
Transactions	and	for	Citizen	Action;	CADTM	-	Committee	for	the	Abolition	of	
Third	World	Debt)	
Created	in	2000	in	Morocco,	this	anti-globalization	organization	is	part	of	an	international	network	collaborating	around	a	shared	platform.	Since	2005	it	has	undergone	restructuring	which	translated	into	the	presence	of	a	strong	Almounadil-a	(Trotskyist)	current.	It	has	almost	500	members.	Mouvement	alternatif	pour	les	libertés	individuelles	(MALI	-	Alternative	
Movement	for	Individual	Liberties)	 Created	in	2009,	first	as	a	Facebook	group	to	defend	freedom	of	conscience,	of	religion,	of	sexual	orientation	and	more	generally,	the	instauration	of	a	secular	state.	Réseau	des	associations	de	quartier	du	Grand	Casablanca	(RESAQ	-	Greater	Casablanca	
Neighborhood	Associations	Network)	
Formed	in	2003	with	about	fifty	neighborhood	associations	by	a	former	extreme	left-wing	political	prisoner,	this	network	seeks	to	build	the	capacities	of	local	organizations	and	to	function	as	a	mediator	with	national	and	international	partners.		
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		 In	particular,	the	‘independents’	warrant	our	attention.	Within	the	M20,	this	self-descriptive	label	is	used	by	cyber-activists,	 largely	ordinary	citizens	and	players	in	the	neighborhood	associations.29	As	the	boundaries	between	associative	space,	trade	unions	and	politics	are	not	airtight,	many	individuals	are	multi-positioned	and	chose	to	put	their	adherence,	past	or	present,	 to	a	political	party	on	the	back	burner,	expressing	 instead	their	 suspicion	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 politics	 of	 ‘organizations’.	 According	 to	 the	 most	seasoned	activists,	the	main	dividing	line	separates,	‘the	traditional	culture	of	politics’	on	one	side,	based	on	hegemony	and	the	values	of	leadership,	hierarchy	and	centralization,	and	 on	 the	 other,	 a	 culture	 inspired	 by	 popular	 education	 and	 social	 forums	 which	privileges	horizontality,	decentralization	and	the	absence	of	leaders	and	spokespersons.		
The ‘independents’ 
All throughout contemporary Moroccan history, the terms ‘independent’ and ‘unaffiliated’ 
and ‘non partisan’ were bandied about in the context of many different types of political 
struggles. Starting in the 1960s, on the eve of each election, spokespersons for the monarchy 
used this repertoire to mobilize against the Mouvement national parties. However, this did 
not stop them from later being organized into the so-called administrative parties. The end 
of the 1980s saw the rebirth of advocacy organizations which then sought to recruit 
‘independents’ in order to reach more than just activists from political organizations. Internal 
tensions rapidly crystalized, however, around the opposition between ‘independents’ and 
‘partisans’. Little by little, the use of the word ‘independent’ came to symbolize the vague 
unease regarding a formless blob with variable geography: the ‘tainted’, ‘corrupted’, 
‘Makhzenized’ and ‘divided’ political class,30 the voluntary sector ‘clientelized’ through the 
particularistic redistribution of the financial manna emanating from the Initiative nationale 
pour le développement humain (INDH - National Human Development Initiative); political 
organizations marginalized by institutionalized politics. Conversely, it is sometimes the case 
that political opponents are wary of ‘independents’ and believe them to be potential 
‘infiltrators’. 	
The	Birth	of	the	M20	
	 Despite	 the	 intensity	of	 the	 interactions	characterizing	the	social	and	historical	construction	of	the	‘Arab	world’,	the	fall	of	Zine	El	Abidine	Ben	Ali	on	January	14th,	2011,	followed	by	that	of	Hosni	Mubarak	on	February	11th,	2011	did	not	in	reality	produce	a																																																									29	These	are	members	of	advocacy	organizations,	 constituted	around	 identity	 issues	 (the	Amazighs)	or	special	interests	within	a	certain	category	of	the	population	(unemployed	graduates,	shantytown	residents,	neighborhoods,	etc.).	30	1.	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	 ‘Jeux	 de	miroir	 de	 la	 “politisation”	 :	 les	 acteurs	 associatifs	 de	 quartier	 à	Casablanca’,	Critique	internationale,	50,	2011,	p.	55–71,	here	p.	59. 
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domino	effect.	It	is	true	that	channels	such	as	Al	Jazeera	encouraged	feelings	of	belonging	to	 a	 single,	 imagined	 community,	 and	 that	 social	 networks	 also	 helped	 to	 expand	 the	possibilities	 for	 communication.	 Nevertheless,	 these	 elements	 did	 not	 suffice	 to	automatically	set	off	a	wave	of	protests,	or	to	short-circuit	the	other	factors	identified	by	social	movement	 sociologists,31	or	 even	 to	marginalize	 seasoned	 activists	 in	 favor	 of	‘newcomers’	 (young	 ‘depoliticized’	 individuals,	 cyber-activists).	 A	 description	 of	 the	M20’s	creation	allows	us	to	identify	the	‘lived	processes	of	diffusion’,	the	diversity	of	the	movement’s	birthplaces,	the	plurality	of	the	channels	via	which	connections	were	made	between	individuals	and	organizations,	as	well	as	the	links	and	events	which	encouraged	the	mobilization	to	spread	beyond	its	core	group	of	pioneers.			 Judging	from	the	interviews	we	conducted,	the	fall	of	the	Tunisian	and	Egyptian	presidents	 just	 a	 few	weeks	 apart	 led	Moroccan	 actors	 to	 adopt	 a	 different	 strategic	perspective	 than	 previously.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 intelligibility	 frame	 of	 the	 political	 arena	became	blurred,	thus	widening	the	horizon	of	possibilities	and	feasibility.	According	to	a	22	year-old	ATTAC-CADTM	member,	‘After	Tunisia,	I	said	to	myself:	just	imagine	a	similar	thing	happening	in	Morocco.	But	after	Egypt,	I	told	myself:	something	absolutely	has	to	happen	here	in	Morocco’.	Through	a	process	of	‘attribution	of	similarity’,	the	individuals	we	 interviewed	 drew	 connections	 between	 the	 problems	 seen	 in	 Tunisia,	 Egypt	 and	Morocco:	social	and	economic	crises,	high	rates	of	unemployment	for	graduates,	disdain	for	the	‘political	masquerade’,	the	king	and	his	inner	circle’s	monopoly	over	power	and	wealth.	 From	 there,	 these	 individuals	 anticipated	 the	more	 or	 less	 similar	 chances	 of	protest	 movements	 being	 successful	 at	 home.32	At	 least	 during	 an	 initial	 period,	 the	leaders	of	the	M20	attributed	Tunisian	and	Egyptian	successes	to	four	main	factors:	the	emphasis	 placed	 on	 ‘depoliticized	 youth’;	 the	 absence	 of	 leadership,	 hierarchy	 and	centralization;	the	important	role	played	by	spontaneity	and	innovation;	and	most	of	all,	the	dissolution	of	identities	(organizational,	ideological,	ethnic,	etc.).	It	was	within	this	framework	that	M20	pioneers	framed	the	image	of	a	‘young’	movement	that	went	beyond	ideological	cleavages	and	bolstered	the	inversion	of	roles	between	seasoned	activists	and	newcomers	thus	ultimately	making	the	leaders	of	the	past	seem	like	mere	followers.																																																									31	Dieter	Rucht,	 ‘The	Transnationalization	of	Social	Movements.	Trends,	Causes,	Problems’,	 in	Donatella	della	 Porta,	 Hanspeter	 Kriesi,	 Dieter	 Rucht	 (eds),	 Social	 Movements	 in	 a	 Globalizing	 World,	 London,	Macmillan,	1999,	p.	223–244.	32	On	the	concepts	of	 ‘assurance	games’	and	the	 ‘bandwagon	effect’,	processes	which	drive	followers	to	participate	 in	 a	movement	 after	 having	 observed	 it	 and	 evaluated	 its	 chances	 for	 success,	 see:	Dennis	Chong,	Collective	Action	and	the	Civil	Rights	Movement,	Chicago,	The	University	Chicago	Press,	1991.	
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	 Although	the	media	and	social	networks	played	a	crucial	role	in	various	processes	of	identification,	they	were	not	a	sufficient	reason	for	protestors	to	take	to	the	streets	on	February	20th.	In	fact,	it	was	at	the	intersection	between	a	wide	variety	of	networks	and	locations	 that	 connections	were	made	between	cyber-activists33	(including	 those	who	also	participated	in	activist	organizations),	militants	and	other	multi-positioned	actors.		 During	 the	 final	 days	 of	 2010,	 Moroccan	 activists	 closely	 followed	 the	demonstrations	taking	place	in	neighboring	countries.	The	authorities	were	likewise	on	the	 lookout.	 On	 January	 13th,	 2011,	 the	 Coordination	 marocaine	 de	 soutien	 aux	démocrates	 tunisiens	 (CoMaSoDeT	 -	 Moroccan	 Committee	 Supporting	 Tunisian	
Democrats)34	organized	a	 sit-in	 in	 front	of	 the	Tunisian	embassy,	which	was	violently	dispersed	—	even	though	actions	of	solidarity	with	Palestine,	Iraq	and	Libya	were	almost	routine	in	Morocco	at	the	time.	After	Ben	Ali’s	downfall,	demonstrations	celebrating	the	Tunisian	 revolution	 finally	 began	 to	 be	 tolerated.	Ultimately,	 associations,	 unions	 and	political	parties	printed	press	releases	and	declarations,	both	as	print	media	and	on	the	Internet,	initially	to	support	the	Tunisian	people	and	then	to	offer	them	congratulations.		 During	 this	 time,	 the	 fever	 spread	 to	 Moroccan	 Facebook	 users.	 The	 media’s	coverage	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 impact	 of	 the	 social	 network	 piqued	 the	 curiosity	 of	novices.	On	January	14th,	three	young	cyber-activists	from	Meknes	created	a	Facebook	group	called	‘Moroccans	Discuss	the	King’.	H.A.	is	one	of	these	three	individuals.	Up	until	that	point,	the	22	year-old	engineering	student	had	never	belonged	to	any	organization	whatsoever	and	his	father,	a	teacher,	rarely	mentioned	his	own	youthful	dalliances	with	extreme-left	wing	politics.	For	the	past	three	years,	however,	H.A.	had	engaged	in	political	debates	 on	 ‘progressive’	 discussion	 Internet	 boards.35	On	 January	25th,	 he	watched	Al	Jazeera	in	a	cafe	with	a	friend	and	became	extremely	frustrated.	That	night	and	the	one	following,	he	 searched	on	 the	 Internet,	 hoping	 to	 find	 a	 call	 to	 protest	 posted	 by	 one	organization	or	another	of	the	radical	Left.	Exasperated,	he	finally	decided	to	take	action	with	 his	 two	 friends.	 On	 January	 27th,	 the	 three	 youths	 rebranded	 their	 group	 as	‘Mouvement	liberté	et	démocratie	maintenant’	(Movement	for	Freedom	and	Democracy	
Now)	and	called	for	people	to	demonstrate	on	February	27th	across	the	country	in	large	
																																																								33	See	Driss	Ksikes,	‘Genèse	du	cyber-activisme	au	Maroc’,	Economia,	12,	Cesem,	Rabat,	2011,	p.	80–83.	34	Created	in	2005	out	of	solidarity	with	the	Tunisian	hunger	strikers,	this	committee	brings	together	over	twenty	different	associations,	unions	and	parties	—	including	the	radical	Left	(RDG),	but	also	the	youth	branch	of	the	USFP	and	the	National	Support	Group	for	Iraq	and	Palestine.		 35	Interview,	December	18th,	2011.	
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public	squares,	in	front	of	police	stations	and	governor’s	mansions.	On	January	27th,	the	group	had	3,000	members.	By	February	3rd,	this	total	had	reached	6,000	members.	The	call	 contained	 six	 demands	 of	 a	 unifying	 nature,	 going	 from	 the	 abrogation	 of	 the	Constitution	and	the	‘appointment	of	a	constitutional	committee	composed	of	the	most	honest	and	qualified	individuals,	charged	with	drafting	a	new	constitution	granting	the	monarchy	its	natural	size’,	to	the	creation	of	an	unemployment	benefit	scheme.	According	to	H.A.,	the	implicit	leaning	towards	a	parliamentary	monarchy	was	merely	a	‘rational’	choice,	 a	project	 that	 ‘could	be	 realized’	 and	which	had	affinities	with	the	 signatories’	condemnation	 of	 violence,	 ‘anarchy’	 and	 ‘Blanquism’. 36 	The	 initial	 choice	 of	 date	provoked	the	authorities	attacks	,	as	February	27th	also	happened	to	be	the	anniversary	of	the	1976	proclamation	of	the	Sahrawi	Arab	Democratic	Republic	by	the	Polisario	front.	In	response,	the	date	was	moved	up	to	February	20th.			 On	January	28th,	Egypt’s	Day	of	Anger	was	met	with	feverish	excitement	on	the	Moroccan	Internet	group.	An	ex-affiliate	of	the	USFP’s	youth	group	in	Salé	posted	a	video	on	YouTube	in	which	he	read	the	call	of	the	Mouvement	liberté	et	démocratie	maintenant.	Thus	the	February	20th	movement	was	created	and	became	a	reference	point	for	a	whole	host	of	groups	on	Facebook,	scattered	across	all	regions	of	the	country.	On	February	3rd,	the	most	widely	read	daily	newspaper	in	Morocco,	Al	Massae,	attacked	the	young	people	who	posted	the	call	and	accused	them	of	colluding	with	the	Algerians	and	the	Polisario.	The	 smear	 campaign	 led	 by	 government	 ministers	 and	 the	 official	 media	 outlets	prompted	a	surge	of	solidarity	with	‘the	youth’,	while	simultaneously	hyping	up	February	20th	as	the	political	event	of	the	moment.			 In	Rabat,	demonstrations	of	support	for	the	Egyptian	people	were	the	opportunity	for	groups	of	young	people	to	meet	on	a	regular	basis.	For	the	most	part,	 these	young	people	were	the	children	of	activists,	supporters	or	members	of	left-wing	organizations.	From	the	beginning,	the	AMDH’s	support	was	crucial.	Drawing	on	its	pioneering	role	at	the	heart	of	multiple	networks,	 the	AMDH	acted	as	both	a	 transmission	channel	and	a	reservoir	of	human	resources	and	logistical	know-how.	Moreover,	it	contributed	to	the	socialization	and	generational	renewal	of	the	radical	Left.	It	is	therefore	not	surprising	that	 its	 offices	 became	 the	 local	 headquarters	 for	 Rabat’s	 youth.	 It	 is	 there	 that	 they	created	the	video	calling	for	‘action’	on	February	20th	and	that	they	posted	the	latter	on																																																									36	Even	though	he	claimed	to	have	not	been	influenced	by	his	father’s	political	experiences,	H.A.	employed	the	same	vocabulary	as	previous	generations	of	activists.		
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YouTube	on	February	12th.	Showing	their	faces,	they	started	by	identifying	themselves	without	revealing	any	affiliations:	‘I	am	a	Moroccan’.		 The	broadcasting	of	this	video	gave	a	face	to	the	movement,	which	thus	ceased	to	be	merely	a	virtual	rumor.	In	response,	the	smear	campaign	sharpened	its	attacks:	the	members	of	the	M20	were	likened	to	‘traitors’	calling	into	question	the	very	basis	of	the	nation	(God,	homeland,	 the	king),	 to	 ‘fringe	elements’	 transgressing	the	 latter’s	values	(converted	Christians,	‘atheists’,	‘fast	breakers’,	‘homosexuals’).	Murky	‘agents’	started	to	act:	 anonymous	phone	calls	were	made,	more	or	 less	 ‘courteous’	 visits	were	paid	and	pressure	was	exerted	on	families.		 In	 Rabat,	 demonstrations	 of	 solidarity	 with	 the	 Egyptian	 revolution	 occurred	almost	daily	and	were	thus	tolerated.	They	encouraged	dialogue	between	young	and	old,	left-wing	activists	and	Islamists	 from	Al	Adl	Wal	 Ihsane,	with	the	result	 that	Saturday,	February	12th’s	sit-in	facing	the	parliament	became	a	veritable	forum	for	debate	where	a	common	goal	was	declared:	‘Going	down	into	the	streets	and	marching	together,	on	the	20th,	all	throughout	Morocco’.		 That	same	Saturday,	a	group	of	youths	in	Rabat	met	up	at	the	AMDH	headquarters	to	rewrite	the	M20’s	platform	and	to	add	new	demands,	this	time	delving	into	the	political	vocabulary	of	the	left-wing	opposition.37	The	monarchy	was	no	longer	mentioned	and	the	political	objective	sought	was	now	‘a	democratic	constitution	which	represents	the	true	will	of	the	people,	drafted	by	an	elected	constitutional	assembly’.		 During	this	time	in	Casablanca,	one	meeting	saw	the	collaboration	of	the	national	representatives	 of	 the	 youth	 branches	 of	 the	 radical	 left-wing	 parties	 (RGD).	 They	published	the	first	declaration	of	support	for	the	February	20th	call	issuing	from	a	political	organization.	The	following	day,	their	stance	was	adopted	by	the	national	leaderships	of	their	 respective	 parties;	 on	 February	 14th,	 seventeen	 human	 rights	 organizations	followed	their	lead.38	During	the	same	time,	the	Organisations	et	démocrates	marocains	(Moroccan	Organizations	and	Democrats)	 issued	 the	Call	of	Dakar	at	 the	World	Social	Forum	(February	6th–12th),	where	they	had	the	opportunity	to	dialogue	with	Tunisians,	Egyptians	and	fellow	citizens	from	other	countries	in	full	revolutionary	effervescence.																																																									37	Since	the	country’s	independence,	the	constitutional	question	has	been	at	stake	for	several	generations	of	opposition	members.	See	Jean-Noël	Ferrié,	Baudouin	Dupret,	‘La	nouvelle	architecture	constitutionnelle	et	les	trois	désamorçages	de	la	vie	politique	marocaine’,	Confluences	Méditerranée,	78,	2011,	p.	25–34.	38	Created	 between	 the	 20th	 and	 the	 23rd	 of	February,	 the	Conseil	 national	 d'appui	au	M20	 (CNAM20	 -	
National	Support	Council	to	the	M20)	groups	together	political	organizations,	as	well	as	large	trade	unions	and	a	hundred	or	so	other	associations.		
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	 Islamist	 organizations	 did	 not	wait	 long	 before	 joining	 the	 fray:	 Al	 Adl’s	 youth	contingent	 declared	 on	 February	 16th	 that	 it	 intended	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 M20	demonstrations.	 Contingents	 from	 the	 PJD	 published	 a	 declaration	 of	 support	 on	February	17th,	 then	 retracted	 it	 following	 the	pressure	of	 the	party’s	higher-ups,	who	were	 in	 negotiations	 with	 the	 authorities.39	Young	 people	 from	 the	 PJD	 nevertheless	ended	up	rallying	around	a	parliamentary	member	 from	the	party	to	 form	the	Baraka	group.40	Disappointed	by	their	leadership’s	reticence	with	regard	to	the	M20,	members	of	the	USFP	published	a	declaration	on	the	18th	signed	‘the	USFP-ists	of	February	20th’.	After	his	initial	skepticism,	a	USFP	parliamentary	member	publically	rallied	to	the	cause,	explaining	that	he	felt	that	the	movement	was	being	subjected	to	a	‘concerted	attack’	by	ministers,	political	parties	and	the	official	media:	‘When	they	take	such	positions,	it	seems	to	me	that	I	should	take	the	other	side’.41		 Driven	by	its	more	fringe	elements,	the	protest	movement	spread	quickly,	causing	the	 emergence	 of	 a	 configuration	 of	 alliances	 that	 appeared	 to	 upset	 the	 social	 and	political	 barriers	 usually	 at	 play	 within	 ‘routine’	 interactions.	 The	 radical	 and	 non-governing	 Left	 joined	 the	movement	 at	 its	 inception	 and	was	 followed	 by	 the	 Al	 Adl	Islamists.	 The	 boundary	 between	 institutionalized	 politics	 and	 protest	 space	 became	blurred:	the	main	force	at	the	heart	of	parliamentary	opposition	(Islamists	from	the	PJD)	and	the	parties	of	the	governing	Left	(the	USFP,	the	PPS)	were	shaken	from	the	inside.	The	media	coverage	of	the	hitherto-unknown	individuals	amplified	the	dissemination	of	the	‘young’	movement’s	image	as	something	that	went	beyond	ideological	cleavages.	The	majority	of	the	M20’s	demands	and	platforms,	as	well	as	their	vague	and	non-prioritized	nature	strengthened	the	movement’s	unifying	dimension	and	encouraged	collaboration	with	a	wide	variety	of	stakeholders,	advocates	for	largely	preexisting	social	and	political	demands,	from	the	most	‘universal’	to	the	most	sectorial.	The	public	support	of	several	intellectuals,	 artists,	 journalists	 and	 businessmen	 helped	 to	 create	 an	 image	 of	 social	diversity.	 While	 the	 movement	 spread,	 ‘non	 relational	 paths	 of	 diffusion’	 appeared	
																																																								39	On	February	17th,	the	Secretary-general	of	the	PJD	announced	that	his	party	was	boycotting	the	M20.	The	next	morning,	the	prosecutor	released	a	member	of	the	PJD’s	general	secretariat,	arrested	for	corruption.	On	February	21st,	the	latter	was	nominated	to	the	Economic	and	Social	Council	(CES).		40	According	to	its	founder,	this	word,	synonymous	with	Kifaya	(‘that’s	enough’)	refers	to	the	watchword	of	the	eponymous	Egyptian	movement	in	2004.	 41	Interview	conducted	in	July	2011.	
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intertwined	with	informal	mediations,	organizational	locus	and	more	or	less	‘abeyance	structures’.42		 All	throughout	the	momentum	leading	up	to	February	20th,	the	authorities	sent	ambivalent	signals,	which	in	turn	fostered	the	impression	among	pioneers	and	potential	followers	of	the	M20	that	the	floodgates	had	finally	been	opened.	In	fact,	after	Ben	Ali’s	fall,	different	measures	were	taken:	negotiations	with	unemployed	graduates	and	unions	were	 sped	 up,	 in	 the	 hopes	 of	 putting	 an	 end	 to	 previous	 sectorial	 protests;	 the	compensation	 fund	 was	 doubled;	 Friday	 preachers	 were	 encouraged	 to	 use	 their	religious	authority	to	preach	against	chaos,	etc.	On	the	one	hand,	the	authorities	tried	to	anticipate	events,	to	gain	some	time,	to	discredit	the	youths	who	called	for	February	20th	demonstrations	and	to	discourage	the	creation	of	connections	between	Facebook	users,	actors	 in	 institutionalized	 politics,	 unemployed	 graduate	movements	 and	 unions,	 and	Islamists.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	authorities	also	marshaled	themselves	to	convey	the	idea	of	the	‘Moroccan	exception’:	reassuring	announcements	let	people	believe	that	there	would	be	no	repression	on	February	20th	and	that	unlike	its	neighbors,	Morocco	would	be	a	democratic	country	where	social	movements	were	frequent	and	normal.		
Birth	of	the	M20	in	Casablanca	
	 Since	the	beginning	in	Casablanca,	the	initiative	was	taken	by	‘organized’	players.	During	the	feverish	excitement	of	the	month	of	February,	Casablanca’s	embryonic	M20	was	formed	at	the	intersection	between	two	structuring	sociopolitical	networks.			 The	first	of	these	networks	was	the	nebulous	grouping	together	of	all	the	left-wing	organizations.	One	of	its	core	elements	was	the	Espace	Casablanca	pour	le	dialogue	de	la	gauche	(ECDG	-	Casablanca	Space	for	the	Left’s	Dialogue),	a	platform	created	in	April	2008	by	multi-positioned	activists,	for	the	most	part	on	the	fringes	of	their	parties	(the	PSU	and	the	USFP).	After	the	defeat	of	the	governmental	and	radical	left-wing	parties	in	2007’s	elections,	the	organization’s	goal	was	to	establish	a	place	for	reflection	in	the	hopes	of	unifying	the	Left.	It	was	the	ECDG	that	called	a	meeting	for	hope	on	February	12th	at	the	PSU’s	downtown	headquarters,	a	space	that	was	welcoming	enough	to	host	meetings	of	all	 sorts	 of	 activists.	 The	 majority	 of	 those	 present	 already	 knew	 each	 other,	 having	collaborated	in	associative	experiences	before	(cf.	Table	2).	Some	had	worked	together																																																									42	On	this	topic,	see	Verta	Taylor,	‘La	continuité	des	mouvements	sociaux.	La	mise	en	veille	du	mouvement	des	femmes’,	in	Olivier	Filleule	(ed.),	Le	désengagement	militant,	Paris,	Belin,	2005,	p.	229–250.	
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during	the	previous	five	years	with	the	Committee	Against	the	High	Cost	of	Living	until	2009,	and	then	again	with	the	Youth	Committees	for	the	Liberation	of	Political	Prisoners	(2008–2009)	and	with	the	Housing	Committee	dealing	with	shantytowns	until	January	2011.		 The	second	structuring	pole,	represented	by	Al	Adl	Wal	Ihsane,	was	more	closed-off.	 In	 reality,	 entry	 into	 this	 organization	 is	 governed	 by	 strict	 rules,	 and	 its	militant	discipline	 entails	 a	 large	 degree	 of	 self-selection. 43 	An	 individual	 and	 collective	pedagogical	program	regulates	both	the	everyday	and	spiritual	life	of	adherents,	who	are	likewise	 encouraged	 to	 challenge	 themselves	 in	 all	 aspects	 of	 their	 lives,	 to	 train	themselves	 both	mentally	 and	 physically,	 to	make	 substantial	 financial	 efforts	 for	 the	good	 of	 the	 organization.	 This	 unauthorized	 political	 organization,	 very	 present	 on	college	campuses	especially	since	the	end	of	the	1980s,	managed	to	branch	out	beyond	its	faithful	adherents	by	casting	a	wider	net,	by	engaging	in	charity	work	and	contributing	to	social	networks	on	the	Internet.		 The	boundaries	between	these	two	networks	were	not	completely	airtight,	as	they	were	both	rooted	in	the	same	urban,	educated	environment	and	comprised	of	relatively	young	individuals	hailing	from	the	lower	or	middle	classes.	The	most	visible	dividing	lines	centered	 around	 political	 issues	 (a	 secular	 vs.	 Islamist	 state)	 and	moral	 or	 religious	matters	 (degree	 of	 adherence	 to	 religious	 duties,	 degree	 of	 support	 for	 individualist	values,	etc.).	Reciprocal	mistrust	and	prejudices	were	conveyed	by	the	media	and	political	tracts,	 or	 through	 first-hand	 experiences	 on	 campuses	 and	 in	 neighborhoods.	 Many	remembered	 previous	 confrontations,	 including	 demonstrations	 for	 solidarity	 with	Palestine	 which	 devolved	 into	 left-wing	 advocates	 and	 Islamists	 stealing	 the	microphones	 from	 each	 other	 to	 chant	 ‘Arab	 Palestine’	 or	 ‘Islamic	 Palestine’,	respectively.44	Nevertheless,	 a	 certain	 feeling	 of	 closeness	was	 not	 unheard	of	 among	those	 rejecting	 institutionalized	 politics	 or	 monarchical	 hegemony,	 be	 they	 from	 the	extreme	Left	or	the	Islamist	camp.	Finally,	the	existence	of	politically	mixed	families	and	of	young	individuals	socialized	in	an	Islamist	environment	but	who	had	become	leftists	was	not	exceptional	in	our	sample	population.	
																																																								43	In	 particular,	 see	Mohamed	Darif,	al-Islamiyyun	 al-maghariba:	 hisabat	 as-siyyasa	 fi	 al-‘amal	 al-islami	
1969–1999	[Moroccan	Islamists:	Political	Considerations	in	Islamist	Activity,	1969–1999],	Casablanca,	Al-Majalla	almaghribiyya	li	‘ilm	al-ijtima‘	as-siyyasi,	1999,	p.	67–76.	44	Mounia	Bennani-Chraïbi,	‘Les	conflits	du	Moyen-Orient	au	miroir	des	communautés	imaginées	:	la	rue	arabe	existe-t-elle	?	Cas	du	Maroc’,	A	Contrario,	5(2),	2008,	p.	147–156.	
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	 Given	Al	Adl’s	highly	centralized	and	hierarchical	nature,	the	participation	of	its	youth	branch	in	M20	events	was	decided	from	the	top-down.	And	it	was	only	after	this	decision	 was	 published	 on	 February	 16th	 that	 the	 leaders	 of	 Casablanca’s	 left-wing	organizations	 made	 contact	 with	 Al	 Adl	 youth	 representatives	 on	 a	 local	 scale.	Nonetheless,	the	choice	of	the	individuals	in	charge	of	forging	this	connection	was	not	insignificant.	Relying	upon	their	ideological	convictions,	their	past	experiences	and	their	personal	dispositions,	two	Trotskyists	from	ATTAC-CADTM	Casablanca	played	a	crucial	role	in	coordinating	these	two	groups	and	maintaining	the	relationship	over	time.	After	having	been	active	within	small	university	groups,	they	became	engaged	with	the	protest	dynamics	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 Casablanca	 the	 last	 few	 years.	 According	 to	 these	 two	individuals,	 revolutionizing	 society	 required	preventing	 conflict	with	other	 social	 and	political	forces.	Enthusiasts	of	the	slogan	‘Walk	Separately	but	Strike	Together’,	they	very	early	on	defended	the	idea	of	integrating	Al	Adl	members	into	the	Committee	on	the	High	Cost	of	Living,	but	other	left-wing	contingents	vehemently	opposed	it.	One	of	the	two	had	returned	from	Cairo,	where	he	had	undergone	a	CADTM	training	program	until	January	30th,	 2011.	 He	 therefore	 experienced	 the	 events	 of	 Tahrir	 Square	 and	 witnessed	 the	cooperation	between	Egyptian	 revolutionaries	of	 all	 stripes.	For	 the	 first	 few	months,	these	two	activists	were	seen	as	a	unifying	force,	highly	appreciated	for	their	conciliatory	nature	 and	 willingness	 to	 sacrifice.	 Like	 the	 other	 backbones	 of	 the	 M20,	 they	 were	largely	available	due	to	their	professional	circumstances	(one	was	unemployed,	the	other	a	teacher).		 Very	quickly,	the	leaders	of	Casablanca’s	M20	implemented	measures	to	organize	a	shared	action	within	the	context	of	a	highly	varied	coalition.	Imbued	with	the	successes	and	 failures	of	 the	past	 as	much	as	with	 the	 ‘example’	of	Tahrir	Square,	 they	 tried	 to	determine	beforehand	which	means	would	best	allow	them	to	resist	repression,	as	well	the	regime’s	attempts	to	co-opt	the	movement.	The	more	or	less	explicit	watchwords	of	the	movement	were:	unify,	‘make	particular	identities	invisible’;45	avoid	hegemony	or	the	misappropriation	 of	 the	 movement	 by	 a	 specific	 political	 contingent;	 discourage	 any	proclivities	towards	individual	or	collective	leadership.	Emphasis	was	equally	placed	on	the	need	to	open	up	enough	to	welcome	newcomers	and	encourage	innovation.	
																																																								45	On	the	modes	of	self-representation	in	politics,	see	Annie	Collovald,	‘Identité(s)	stratégique(s)’,	Actes	de	
la	recherche	en	sciences	sociales,	73,	1988,	p.	29–40.	
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	 Between	 February	 15th	 and	 18th,	 preparatory	 sessions	 delved	 into	 university	activist	 know-how	 to	 instate	 two	 rules:	 any	 participation	 in	 a	 committee	 had	 to	 be	confirmed	 by	 the	 general	 assembly;	 the	 sole	 official	 decision-making	 body	 of	 the	movement	 was	 to	 be	 the	 general	 assembly.	 Participants	 in	 the	 general	 assembly	 on	February	18th	 signed	an	attendance	 register;	 in	 the	 column	 for	marking	affiliation,	 all	identified	themselves	as	members	of	the	M20.	During	the	general	assemblies	that	took	place	over	the	following	few	months,	any	person	citing	the	name	of	an	organization	was	brought	to	heel.	In	addition,	the	choice	of	coordinators	(from	ATTAC,	the	ANDCM,	MALI...)	approved	by	the	general	assembly	during	the	formation	of	the	first	committees	(logistics,	slogans,	mobilization,	communication)	seemed	to	obey	to	a	few	implicit	criteria:	favoring	trusted	persons,	 avoiding	both	unaffiliated	actors	and	party	members,	 in	order	to	put	forth	 individuals	 endowed	 with	 activist	 skills	 while	 guaranteeing	 the	 organization’s	independence	 vis-à-vis	 political	 parties.	 Members	 of	 political	 organizations	 were	nevertheless	encouraged	 to	belong	 to	 the	 logistics	 committee,	 so	 that	 the	 latter	 could	benefit	from	their	contacts	and	connections,	as	well	as	mobilize	sufficient	funds	to	print	tracts,	make	banners	and	set	up	sound	systems.		 Before	Sunday,	February	20th,	 the	absence	of	 the	 ‘Facebook	youth’	worried	 the	leaders	of	Casablanca’s	M20.	Drawing	upon	the	model	of	Tunisian	and	Egyptian	cyber-revolutionaries,	they	thus	decided	to	broadcast	the	general	assembly’s	conclusions	from	February	18th	on	Facebook	and	 to	 invite	 the	young	Facebookers	 to	 join	 them	Sunday,	February	20th	at	10	o’clock	in	the	morning,	on	Lahmam	Square.	The	spacious	nature	and	proximity	to	the	prefecture	of	this	centrally	situated	square	in	the	administrative	heart	of	 Casablanca	 made	 it	 an	 ideal	 location	 for	 many	 of	 the	 sit-ins	 that	 occurred	 in	 the	economic	capital.	In	the	tract	distributed,	the	action	was	not	explicitly	‘named’	—	it	was	not	 a	 ‘sit-in’	 (waqfa),	 nor	 a	 ‘march’	 (masira).	 According	 to	 one	 ATTAC	 activist,	 the	Facebook	call	suggested	that	‘different’	people	would	be	participating,	and	that	therefore	the	newcomers	should	be	left	‘free’	to	‘do	something	different’.46			 February	20th	was	seen	as	a	success	by	the	leaders	of	Casablanca’s	M20	for	three	major	 reasons:	 the	 number	 of	 its	 participants,	 their	 diversity	 and	 the	 ambiance	 that	prevailed	until	the	organizers	called	for	dispersion	around	4pm.	Indeed,	according	to	the	press,	 the	 square	 welcomed	 almost	 6,000	 individuals	 at	 the	 height	 of	 the	 protest.	
																																																								46	Interview,	September	2011.	
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Business	owners,	famous	artists,	NGO	and	association	activists,	former	political	prisoners	and	even	a	 few	members	of	parliament	were	spotted	among	the	crowd.	Young	people	who	had	never	taken	part	in	any	election	or	protest	and	who	had	never	belonged	to	a	political	organization	heeded	the	call:	they	came	with	their	families,	with	their	neighbors,	or	with	their	group	of	friends.	The	preparations	undertaken	days	before	the	protest	as	well	 as	 the	negotiations	 conducted	on	 site	by	members	of	M20	committees	helped	 to	encourage	a	certain	‘unification’	of	the	action:	barring	a	few	exceptions,	‘the	slogans	and	banners	were	unified	in	tone,	different	identities	all	blended	together	like	in	Tunisia	or	on	Tahrir	Square	[...]	the	ambiance	was	good-natured’.47		 Nevertheless,	after	the	organizers	called	for	the	demonstration	to	break	up,	people	arrived	 from	 the	 Medina,	 a	 working-class	 neighborhood	 on	 the	 outskirts	 of	 town,	following	the	end	of	a	football	match.	According	to	some	seasoned	activists	watching,	they	tried	to	prolong	the	event	by	a	march	much	like	the	‘chaotic’	ones	seen	exiting	football	stadiums.	 Some	 young	 people,	 on	 site	 since	 10am,	 then	 called	 for	 an	 unlimited	 sit-in	(i’tisam):	they	brought	tents	in	the	hopes	of	occupying	the	center	of	Casablanca	much	like	Tahrir	Square.	The	M20	members	who	had	not	already	dispersed	attempted	to	create	a	security	cordon,	but	were	rapidly	overwhelmed.	When	the	M20’s	planned	action	ended	at	4pm,	security	forces	—	hitherto	relegated	to	the	sidelines	—	started	to	intervene	in	a	cautious	manner;	the	evacuation	was	not	complete	until	after	10pm.		 After	that	Sunday,	the	M20	became	a	local	and	national	phenomenon,	with	phases	of	ebb	and	flow.	In	an	‘interplay	of	levels’	between	internal,	local,	national,	regional	and	international	 scales,	 the	 intertwining	 of	 actions,	 interactions	 and	 events	 helped	 to	consolidate	as	well	as	reshape	the	M20	(both	synchronically	and	diachronically),	at	times	favoring	its	spread	and	at	others,	contributing	to	its	losing	steam.	For	the	sake	of	clarity,	we	shall	separate	our	presentation	of	these	two	intricately	linked	processes.			
The	Consolidation	of	the	M20	Coalition	and	the	Spread	of	Protests	
		 While	it	was	not	long	before	the	seeds	of	discord	were	sown,	a	certain	combination	of	elements	enabled	the	M20’s	consolidation	in	Casablanca	and	the	continuing	spread	of	protests.	Some	of	these	elements	were	linked	to	interactions	with	the	authorities	and	self-																																																								47	Interview	with	an	ATTAC	activist,	November	2011.	
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perception	at	the	different	national,	regional	and	international	levels;	others	were	tied	to	the	internal	dynamics	of	the	coalition.		
	
Interactions	Which	Encouraged	Fluidity		 After	February	20th,	 the	authorities	 continued	to	broadcast	 the	message	of	 ‘the	Moroccan	 exception’.	 Barring	 a	 few	 events	 deemed	 to	 be	 isolated,	 demonstrations	occurred	in	a	peaceful	climate	and	attested	to	the	country’s	‘maturity’	and	‘democratic’	nature.		 The	royal	discourse	pronounced	on	March	9th,	2011	was	seen	as	both	recognizing	the	 M20	 and	 attempting	 to	 pull	 the	 rug	 out	 from	 under	 the	 movement	 by	 offering	appealing	 opportunities	 for	 reform.	 The	 speech	 proclaimed	 the	 acceleration	 of	 the	‘reformist	momentum’	and	the	regionalization	process,	‘global	constitutional	reform’,	a	constitutional	referendum,	etc.	It	was	both	preceded	and	followed	by	the	implementation	of	an	institutional	framework	for	opening	the	country	up:	the	establishment	of	the	Social	and	Economic	 Council	 (CES)	 on	 February	21st;	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 Consultative	Council	on	Human	Rights	(CCDH)	into	the	National	Council	for	Human	Rights	(CNDH)	on	March	4th	with	the	nomination,	for	secretary-general,	of	a	former	non-governing	left-wing	political	prisoner	and	the	former	president	of	the	Moroccan	Truth	and	Justice	Forum;	the	creation	of	 the	Consultative	Commission	 for	Constitutional	Revision	 (CCRC)	on	March	10th	and	of	the	Ombudsman	Institution	on	March	17th,	etc.	International	reactions	were	not	 long	 in	 coming:	 the	 king	 was	 heralded	 as	 a	 model	 by	 Western	 powers	 and	 the	European	Union	expressed	 its	satisfaction	by	 tangibly	 increasing	 its	 annual	 aid	 to	 the	country.		 During	 this	 period,	 the	 dominant	 media	 and	 political	 discourse	 adopted	 an	enthusiastic	tone:	‘the	M20,	those	are	our	children’,	‘we’re	all	part	of	the	M20’,	‘the	M20	has	 managed	 to	 do	 what	 years	 of	 political	 struggle	 failed	 to	 do’.	 At	 the	 intersection	between	 protest	 space	 and	 the	 institutionalized	 political	 scene,	 the	 M20’s	 dynamic	continued	to	spread	to	a	number	of	other	domains,	from	the	official	media	to	municipal	councils.	The	governing	Left	witnessed	 the	exacerbation	of	 internal	 tensions	between	‘those	who	had	adopted	the	habit	of	having	the	monarchy	as	their	sole	interlocutor’	and	those	who	hoped	to	break	with	cooptative	logic,	which,	according	to	them,	had	led	to	the	impasse	of	institutionalized	politics.	These	conflicts	were	expressed	via	traditional	media	
Revue française de science politique, 2012/5 (vol. 62) 
	 25	
outlets,	 but	 especially	 in	 exchanges	 on	 Facebook,	 where	 the	 tone	 often	 betrayed	 the	gradual	blurring	of	lines	between	backstage	transcript	and	public	discourse.	The	royal	discourse	went	beyond	the	 first	group’s	expectations,	while	not	satisfying	those	of	the	second	group.	And	with	regard	to	the	non-governing	Left	which	supported	the	M20,	and	more	 specifically	 the	 PSU,	 these	 leaders	 largely	 chose	 not	 to	 play	 a	 mediating	 role	between	the	movement	and	the	authorities,	leading	their	organizations	to	‘be	swept	away	by	the	M20’.48		 The	movement	was	 thus	 confronted	with	 two	challenges:	how	 to	 respond	 to	a	royal	discourse	 in	both	an	 ideological	and	a	practical,	on-the-ground	manner?	How	to	impose	the	movement’s	continued	growth?	In	Casablanca,	March	13th’s	repression	gave	the	coalition	a	way	out	of	this	dilemma.	Clashes	with	the	forces	of	law	and	order	reached	the	entrance	to	the	PSU’s	headquarters,	where	the	party’s	National	Council	was	held.	The	PSU’s	leaders	joined	forces	with	the	M20,	calling	for	an	‘unlimited	sit-in’,	until	a	hundred	arrested	activists	were	released.	M20	supporters	saw	this	episode	as	a	message	from	the	authorities:	March	9th’s	royal	discourse	marked	a	certain	form	of	closure,	and	demands	now	needed	to	be	expressed	in	the	context	of	the	reform	measures	put	forth.	Following	media	 coverage	 of	 the	 event,	 international	 organizations	 published	 declarations	 of	support	for	the	M20.		 On	another	level,	this	intense	period	generated	a	strong	sense	of	cohesion	within	the	 group.	 ‘The	 left-wing	 activist	 has	 been	 attacked	 instead	 of	 the	 Islamist’	 and	 ‘the	lessons	 learned	 by	 the	 Egyptians	 on	 Tahrir	 Square	 were	 implemented’. 49 	Al	 Adl	supporters	now	began	to	appear	on	the	frontlines.	ATTAC	activists	continued	to	play	their	unifying	role.	It	was	in	fact	an	ATTAC	member	who	proposed	that	an	Al	Adl	supporter	give	the	closing	speech	at	March	6th’s	sit-in;	 likewise	this	activist	called	 for	a	sit-in	on	March	8th,	in	honor	of	International	Women’s	Day,	in	the	hopes	of	alleviating	the	fears	of	the	secularists.	At	this	stage	in	the	game,	no	one	contingent	dared	to	take	responsibility	for	a	potential	failure.	Success	was	increasingly	seen	as	dependent	upon	the	effacement	of	specific	differences.		
When	the	M20	Won	the	‘Battle	for	Public	Opinion’:	March	20th–April	24th	
																																																								48	Interview	with	a	PSU	member,	December	2011.		49	Interview	with	an	Al	Adl	supporter,	April	2011.	
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	 If,	during	the	previous	phase,	the	monarchy	and	the	M20	seemed	to	be	tied	in	the	‘battle	for	public	opinion’,50	the	national	marches51	on	March	20th	and	April	24th	officially	consecrated	 the	 movement.	 All	 across	 Morocco,	 more	 than	 a	 hundred	 different	committees	organized	protest	actions	on	April	24th.	For	over	a	month,	the	movement	gave	the	impression	that	it	had	‘won	over’	the	Makhzen.			 In	Casablanca,	the	M20’s	coordination	mobilized	intensely	to	obtain	the	right	to	demonstrate	without	asking	for	authorization,52	in	the	hopes	of	demonstrating	its	ability	to	rally	many	people,	to	take	over	the	streets	and	to	hold	rank.	Starting	on	March	20th,	the	organization	called	for	‘popular	marches’	(masira	sha’biyya)	to	occur	on	an	almost	weekly	basis,	while,	elsewhere	in	the	country,	other	branches	of	the	M20	continued	to	organize	sit-ins.	The	apex	of	Casablanca’s	M20’s	activist	self-discipline	was	witnessed	on	Sunday,	April	 24th,	 during	 a	 march	 that	 had	 between	 10,000	 and	 35,000	 participants	 (cf.	photograph	1).	That	day,	the	protestors	were	more	diverse	than	ever	before,	including	not	only	the	pioneers	and	followers	of	organizations	supporting	the	M20,	but	also	figures	from	 the	 governing	 Left,	 members	 of	 the	 Baraka	 movement	 (led	 by	 a	 PJD	parliamentarian),	businessmen	and	artists.	Individuals	representing	sectorial	demands	were	particularly	present:	street	vendors,	shantytown	dwellers	condemned	to	eviction,	retirees	from	the	Auxiliary	Forces,	fruit	and	vegetable	sellers	gathered	under	a	banner	calling	for	the	director	of	the	wholesale	market	to	‘get	out’,	etc.		 Between	March	20th	and	April	24th,	security	forces	kept	a	certain	distance	from	the	marches	and	demonstrations.	Participants	were	aware	of	the	fact	that	the	authorities	wanted	to	look	good	and	avoid	the	use	of	repression,	as	much	as	possible,	on	the	eve	of	an	important	event	—	the	Security	Council	being	due	to	decide	by	the	end	of	April	on	the	extension	of	the	United	Nations	mandate	regarding	the	organization	of	a	referendum	in	Western	Sahara	(MINURSO).	During	this	time,	the	authorities	continued	to	try	and	buy	the	social	peace,	liberating	190	political	prisoners	on	April	14th.53		
Internal	Dynamics	Fuel	Commitment																																																									50	The	expressions	‘winning’	or	‘losing’	the	‘public	opinion	battle’	were	all	part	of	the	vocabulary	used	by	our	interviewees.		51	Monthly	protest	events	were	nation-wide,	while	others	depended	on	their	affiliated	organizations.		52	The	demonstration	was	presided	over	by	the	Dahir	of	civil	liberties	and,	in	principle,	answered	to	the	reporting	system. 53	Among	these	were	Sahrawi	activists	and	individuals	arrested	following	the	May	16th,	2003	attacks	in	Casablanca,	whose	members	were	assumed	to	belong	to	the	‘Salafiyya	jihadiyya’.	
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	 Between	the	end	of	February	and	April	24th,	the	most	committed	members	of	the	M20	believed	in	the	movement’s	ability	to	exert	pressure	on	the	Makhzen.	The	battles	waged	 were	 seen	 as	 successful	 and	 generally	 helped	 to	 further	 encourage	 solidarity	within	 the	group.	Many	had	 the	 impression	 that	 they	were	 living	 through	a	historical	turning	point,	not	to	be	missed.	Harmonious	relations	between	Al	Adl	supporters	and	left-wing	 activists	 were	 at	 their	 apogee.	 Young	 women	 in	 tight	 jeans	 and	 revealing	 tops	associated	with	those	wearing	veils.	One	woman	observed	that	Al	Adl	supporters	finally	consented	to	shaking	hands	with	women.54		 In	addition,	the	packed	calendar	of	activist	events	produced	a	‘hyper-stimulating	effect	 on	 commitment’: 55 	weekly	 marches,	 general	 assemblies,	 committee	 meetings,	leaflet	 distribution	 campaigns,	 localized	 actions	 to	 protest	 specific	 administrations	 or	demand	 the	 release	 of	 activists	 arrested.	 Moreover,	 the	 feverish	 excitement	 of	 the	marches	became	like	an	addiction	for	many.	
																																																								54	One	of	 the	practices	condemned	by	 the	Islamist	movement’s	 code	of	behavior	outside	of	 the	activist	world.	 55	On	this	topic,	see	Daniel	Gaxie,	‘Économie	des	partis	et	rétributions	du	militantisme’,	Revue	française	de	
science	politique,	27(1),	February	1977,	p.	123–154.	
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	 Photograph	1.	April	24th,	2011	March	in	Downtown	Casablanca
	The	march	was	unified	by	the	presence	of	one	organizer	every	five	rows,	a	megaphone	every	ten	rows,	a	large	M20	banner	(6	by	1.2	meters)	every	600	meters	and	four	audio-enabled	vehicles	every	 kilometer.	 Photograph	 given	 to	 the	 authors	 by	 a	 member	 of	 the	 M20-Casablanca’s	Communication	Committee.			 	
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Moreover,	the	M20’s	vitality	depended	on	new	or	revived	social	relations	which	were	formed,	primarily	among	peer	groups,	at	the	headquarters	of	the	organizations	that	supported	the	M20,	within	the	M20	itself,	or	in	local	cafés	in	the	center	of	town.	Under	the	auspices	of	the	more	experienced	activists,	neophytes	(both	young	and	old)	became	familiar	with	a	new	world	of	meanings	and	practices	(activist,	artistic,	etc.).	Among	them,	some	took	the	next	step	and	joined	one	of	the	organizations	supporting	the	M20;	others	experienced	the	feeling	of	belonging	to	a	new	family,	and	still	others	lived	beautiful	love	stories.	When	one	of	these	love	stories	culminated	in	a	marriage,	February	20th	slogans	were	chanted	alongside	the	traditional	youyou	cries.		
Reconfiguration	and	Disintegration	Processes	of	the	M20	Coalition			 The	 phases	 of	 reconfiguration	 and	 disintegration	 experienced	 by	 the	 M20	coalition	did	not	automatically	stem	from	the	organization’s	laying	down	of	roots	or	the	spread	 of	 its	 protests.	 In	 the	 jumble	 of	 occurrences	 perceived	 as	 decisive,	 or	 barely	perceptible	micro-events,	it	is	sometimes	the	case	that	interactions	favor	a	movement’s	development	in	the	short-term,	while	carrying	in	their	wake	the	seeds	of	what	will	be	its	eventual	disintegration.	Nevertheless,	if	we	limit	our	analysis	to	the	sequencing	related	to	 the	 main	 defections	 suffered	 by	 the	 M20	 in	 2011,	 we	 can	 identify	 two	 important	turning	 points.	 Following	April	 24th’s	march,	 the	movement	 experienced	 a	 number	 of	relatively	definitive	defeats,	 losing	actors	at	 the	 intersection	between	 institutionalized	politics	 and	protest	 activity.	On	December	18th,	2011,	 after	 the	 results	of	November’s	legislative	 elections	were	 announced,	 Al	 Adl,	 a	 powerful	 organization	 entirely	 on	 the	margins	of	institutionalized	politics,	declared	its	defection	from	the	M20.		
Interactions	Weakening	the	M20		 Even	 as	 the	 M20	 linked	 the	 conditions	 of	 its	 success	 to	 its	 ability	 to	 blur	 the	particular	identities	of	its	members	and	shape	an	‘us’	fighting	against	a	‘them’	associated	with	the	Makhzen,	offers	of	reform	and	pressures	exerted	on	the	Movement	started	to	attack	the	very	foundations	of	this	‘us’.	In	addition	to	defections,	the	coalition’s	members	began	 to	 feel	 threatened	 by	 both	 the	 official	Makhzen	 and	 what	 they	 thought	 was	 a	‘Makhzen	within’,	composed	of	infiltrators	and	co-opted	individuals.	
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	 Perceived	 as	 so	 many	 acts	 recognizing	 the	 M20,	 the	 measures	 taken	 by	 the	monarchy	to	drive	the	debate	out	of	the	streets	and	onto	the	institutionalized	political	scene	actually	served	to	expand	the	spread	of	protests.	But	in	so	far	as	they	encouraged	the	expression	of	more	horizontal	differences	(issues	regarding	the	Commander	of	the	Faithful,	the	Islamic	nature	of	the	state,	the	status	of	the	Amazigh	language,	the	role	of	women,	etc.),	these	measures	sorely	challenged	the	M20’s	attempt	to	construct	a	face-to-face	debate	between	‘those	governing	and	those	governed’.56	The	Constitutional	Revision	Council	was	initially	boycotted	by	the	M20,	the	AMDH,	ATTAC	and	two	parties	very	active	at	the	heart	of	the	M20,	the	PSU	and	Annahj.	On	the	other	hand,	thirty	or	so	parties,	five	important	unions	and	a	dozen	NGOs	accepted	the	invitation	proffered	by	the	CCRC.	More	significantly,	at	the	very	moment	when	the	M20	was	experiencing	its	finest	hour,	these	parties	were	participating	in	the	CCRC	consultations	while	loosening	their	grip	on	their	younger	 members,	 who	 continued	 to	 participate	 in	 M20	 protests.	 Some	 individuals	believed	 they	were	 seeing	 the	 inverse	 of	 the	movement’s	 initial	 processes.	 Instead	 of	revolutionizing	 their	 parties	 from	 the	 inside,	 the	 adherents	 of	 the	 February	 20th	movement	 within	 these	 organizations	 seemed	 to	 have	 become	 the	 pawns	 of	 their	respective	 parties,	 which	 sought	 to	 strengthen	 their	 positions	 in	 the	 world	 of	institutionalized	politics	by	demonstrating	their	ability	 to	cause	trouble	 in	 the	protest	space.	The	PJD’s	Baraka	movement	and	USFP	members	of	the	M20	were	among	the	first	to	 defect	 from	 the	 organization,	 following	 June	 17th’s	 royal	 speech	 announcing	 the	constitutional	referendum;	they	did,	however,	threaten	to	rejoin	the	movement	if	these	reform	processes	did	not	meet	their	expectations.	In	passing,	let	us	emphasize	the	fact	that	 the	 leaders	 of	 these	 parties	 believed	 they	 were	 well	 placed	 to	 influence	 the	constitutional	reform	process	and	eventually,	to	help	reshape	institutionalized	politics	to	their	 advantage.	 As	 for	 the	 labor	 unions,	 they	 maintained	 an	 intermediate	 position.	Consequently,	some	M20	members	concluded	that	ever	since	the	union’s	participation	in	the	politics	of	‘social	dialogue’	begun	in	1996,	these	organizations	were	no	longer	capable	of	mobilizing	the	working	masses	by	calling	for	general	strikes,	as	had	been	done	in	1981	and	1990	—	and	even	less	able	to	block	the	systems	of	production	and	distribution.	
																																																								56	See	 J.-N.	Ferrié,	B.	Dupret,	 ‘La	nouvelle	architecture	constitutionnelle’,	art.	 cit.	More	generally	on	 the	‘lessons	learned’	by	the	region’s	regimes	following	Ben	Ali	and	then	Mubarak’s	fall	from	power,	see	Steven	Heydemann,	Reinoud	Leenders,	 ‘Authoritarian	Learning	and	Authoritarian	Resilience’,	Globalizations,	8,	2011,	p.	647–653.	
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	 Simultaneously,	 the	 ‘March	 9th	 Youth	 Movement’	 and	 the	 ‘Young	 Royalists’,	unprecedented	counter-currents	in	Morocco,	began	to	try	to	discredit	the	M20	as	one	of	their	 main	 goals. 57 	Meanwhile,	 security	 forces	 continued	 to	 rely	 on	 tried	 and	 true	techniques.	 ‘Profiling’	 M20	members	 allowed	 the	 security	 forces	 to	 know	 numerous	intimate	details	about	the	activists,	and	they	consequently	‘established	files	on	them’	in	order	to	intimidate	or	buy	off	individuals,	and	infiltrate	or	play	upon	the	contradictions	of	the	movement,	thus	tarnishing	its	unified	public	image.	It	was	not	long	before	suspicion	crept	into	the	movement,	leading	members	to	mistrust	anyone	‘too	well	dressed’,	or	who	owned	fancy	cameras	or	snapped	pictures	like	the	cops.		 Additionally,	centrifugal	forces	were	seen	as	‘police	maneuvers’.	As	early	as	March,	they	were	expressed	via	the	creation	of	the	Collectif	des	indépendants	du	Mouvement	du	20	 février	 (The	 February	 20th	Movement	 Independents’	 Collective).	 At	 the	 head	 of	 this	initiative,	the	president	of	one	neighborhood	association	accused	‘organizations’	(hay’at)	of	 having	 established	 a	 ‘hard	 core’	 in	 order	 to	work	 in	 the	 shadows	 and	wield	 their	influence	over	the	M20.	This	 ‘neighborhood	son’	(weld	ad-derb)	explained	that	during	every	one	of	his	partisan,	electoral,	or	associative	experiences,	others	‘exploited	his	local	popularity’	to	‘get	ahead’.58	Once	again	he	felt	dispossessed.		 Even	more	than	defections	and	repression,	what	shook	the	movement	were	the	‘nuisances’	caused	by	some	of	the	group’s	members,	which	in	turn	exacerbated	suspicions	regarding	‘the	internal	Makhzen’.	Those	suspected	of	being	agents	of	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior	or	of	local	elected	officials	received	the	epithet	of	‘the	baltagis	within’.59	General	assemblies	grew	longer	and	longer,	in	an	increasingly	hostile	environment	of	verbal	and	sometimes	 even	 physical	 confrontation.	 In	 an	 almost	 ritualistic	 manner,	 every	 time	tempers	flared	during	a	general	assembly,	participants	would	chant	two	specific	slogans.	The	first	was	accompanied	by	a	gesture	designating	the	enemy	within,	‘Makhzen	get	out!’	(wa	al-makhzen	ytle‘	barra).	The	second	was	an	attempt	to	restore	the	peace:	‘United	in	solidarity,	we	will	achieve	our	goals’.	With	hindsight,	many	activists	have	realized	that	all	their	energy	was	channeled	into	these	‘disturbances’.60																																																									57	For	the	first	time,	the	‘royalists’	became	visible	via	social	networks	and	counter-demonstrations,	not	as	a	consolidated	embodiment	of	‘the	people’,	but	as	a	contingent	in	conflict	with	a	movement	attacking	royal	prerogatives.	58	Interview,	November	21st,	2011. 59	As	of	January	2011,	in	Egypt	this	word	designated	the	‘thugs	and	hoodlums’	recruited	by	the	security	forces	to	intimate	protestors	and	opposition	members.		60	Interview,	September	18th,	2011.	
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Consequences	of	the	Internal	Struggles	Against	the	Makhzen		 According	 to	our	hypothesis,	 the	 struggles	waged	by	 the	M20	against	both	 the	official	Makhzen	 and	 the	 ‘Makhzen	within’,	 as	well	 as	 the	 reorientations	 designed	 to	compensate	 for	 defections,	 gradually	 altered	 the	 coalition’s	 original	 balance,	 both	strengthening	the	positions	of	those	with	the	greatest	activist	capabilities/resources	and,	in	the	medium	term,	sowing	the	seeds	of	discord.		 First	of	all,	the	‘organized’	M20	activists	—	or	the	‘hard	core’	—	very	quickly	got	into	the	habit	of	meeting	outside	of	the	general	assemblies	to	‘solidify’	and	‘protect’	the	movement.	 The	 desire	 to	 have	 a	 ‘successful	 March	 20th	 demonstration’	 led	 to	 the	intensive	mobilization	of	activist	know-how,	the	human	and	logistical	resources	of	the	most	 seasoned	 organizations	 to	 distribute	 leaflets,	 to	 provide	 an	 800-strong	 security	force	during	the	march,	 to	set	up	the	sound	system	and	to	ensure	the	march’s	unified	nature	 (cf.	 photograph	 1).	 Whereas	 some	 people	 marveled	 at	 this	 famous	 march’s	organization,	 one	 videographer	 expressed	 the	 feeling	 that	 ‘the	M20’s	 youth	 had	 been	robbed’.	That	day,	observers	got	the	impression	that	Al	Adl	supporters	were	‘flexing	their	muscles’	during	the	march.	Later	on,	M20	members	would	reveal	that	except	for	ATTAC,	from	this	day	forth,	the	left-wing	contingent	of	the	organization	began	to	delegate	more	and	more	 logistical	 tasks	 ‘out	of	 laziness’.	During	 the	 following	months	and	especially	during	 the	 summer	of	2011,	 the	unease	 felt	 by	 some	M20	members	—	especially	 the	‘independents’	—	only	grew	when	faced	with	the	‘quasi	paramilitary	organization’	of	the	organization’s	demonstrations	and	marches.			 Next,	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 early	 defections	 and	 play	 ‘the	 numbers	 game’	 in	preparation	 for	 the	 constitutional	 referendum,	May	 3rd’s	 general	 assembly	 decided	 to	move	 the	 marches,	 generally	 held	 in	 the	 city	 center,	 to	 the	 poorer	 districts.	 Other	considerations	justified	this	change	in	the	eyes	of	most	of	the	‘hard	core’	activists:	weekly	demonstrations	in	the	city	center	had	become	‘repetitive’	and	no	longer	surprised	people;	the	movement’s	voice	needed	to	be	heard	in	all	neighborhoods,	even	reaching	those	who	had	never	heard	of	Facebook;	 and	protests	would	be	more	 ‘effective’	 in	denser	areas.	Some	individuals	reevaluated	their	perception	of	similarities	with	Egypt	and	came	to	the	conclusion	that	the	M20	was	in	fact	in	the	same	position	as	the	Egyptian	Kifaya	movement	in	2004.	Spreading	to	other	neighborhoods	was	thus	an	ideal	opportunity	to	‘root	itself	in	 the	hearts	and	minds	of	 the	people’	and	expand	 its	popular	base	 in	preparation	 for	
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future	 struggles.	 This	 choice	 provoked	 internal	 tensions,	 in	 particular	 after	 the	repressions	that	occurred	on	May	22nd	 and	29th.61	‘Unaffiliated’	participants,	members	from	the	governing	Left	and	even	the	PSU	believed	that	Al	Adl	supporters	and	radical	left-wing	activists	were	trying	to	‘provoke	the	Makhzen’	by	enflaming	poorer	neighborhoods,	thus	 losing	 the	 support	of	 businessmen	 and	 the	 ‘middle	 classes’	 involved	 in	 the	M20.	Specifically,	 they	 accused	 Al	 Adl	 of	 organizing	 marches	 within	 its	 bastions	 and	 thus	increasing	its	hold	over	the	M20.	More	generally,	activists	interpreted	May’s	repression	as	 a	 reaction	 of	 the	 authorities	 threatened	 by	 the	M20	protesting	 in	 ‘hard	 to	 control’	areas:	 the	 specter	 of	 the	 1981	 riots	 was	 effectively	 raised.	 These	 individuals	 also	perceived	 a	 certain	 desire	 to	 curb	 the	 protest	 momentum	 before	 the	 constitutional	referendum	and	the	summer	holidays.		 The	 repression	experienced	during	 the	month	of	May	also	affected	 the	group’s	performances	in	a	different	way.	It	disorganized	the	coalition,	encouraged	spontaneity	and	 allowed	 new	 hierarchies	 to	 emerge.	 Certain	 activists	 did	 not	 wait	 long	 before	declaring	that	‘as	soon	as	blows	make	the	cameras	retreat,	those	who	like	to	strut	about	will	also	step	back’.	Just	like	during	on	March	13th,62	the	‘radicalization’	of	slogans	was	first	prompted	by	 the	 circumstances	of	 the	protest	 itself.	The	 lack	of	high-tech	 sound	systems	emphasized	the	reactive	nature	of	 the	slogans	chanted	by	activists	who	were	propped	 up	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 the	 strongest	 among	 them.	 The	 trend	 towards	radicalization	was	equally	linked	to	the	M20	coalition’s	new	configuration.	A	member	of	the	slogan	committee	affiliated	with	the	non-governing	Left	explained	that	he	stopped	exercising	self-limitation	once	the	UFSP	announced	its	participation	in	the	constitutional	referendum:	‘it	was	to	spare	them	that	we	avoided	certain	slogans’.63	During	this	phase,	the	 tone	 taken	 vis-à-vis	 the	 king	 became	 increasingly	 transgressive.	 Starting	 in	 June,	however,	 when	 faced	 with	 the	 international	 community’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 repressive	incidents	of	 the	previous	month,	Moroccan	authorities	began	to	 favor	 ‘sub-contracting	out	repression’.64	
																																																								61	During	these	episodes,	security	forces	tried	to	prevent	the	use	of	lethal	force.	During	the	period	stretching	from	February	20th	to	October	27th	2011,	however,	the	AMDH	counted	ten	‘martyrs	of	the	February	20th	Movement’.	62	That	day,	as	soon	as	blows	began	to	rain	down	on	demonstrators,	the	slogan	that	had	been	‘A	king	who	reigns	but	does	not	govern’	became	‘A	king	who	does	not	reign	and	does	not	govern’.		63	Interview,	September	2011.	64	With	this	expression,	M20	activists	referred	to	the	attacks	perpetrated	(stone	throwing,	stabbings)	by	the	‘thugs’	they	accused	of	being	recruited	by	the	authorities	or	local	elected	officials.		
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	 Defections,	 the	 struggle	 against	 both	 the	 inner	 and	 outer	Makhzen	 and	 acts	 of	repression	fostered	two	different	dynamics.	On	the	one	hand,	the	choices	favored	by	the	M20	were	interpreted	by	a	number	of	actors,	both	within	and	without	the	movement,	as	signs	of	its	‘radicalization’	—	this	perception	in	turn	engendering	new	sources	of	internal	tension.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	positions	and	complicity	of	 those	with	greater	activist	capital	were	reinforced	within	the	coalition,	to	the	detriment	of	the	‘independents’:	Al	Adl	supporters	and	some	radical	 left-wing	activists	mutually	perceived	each	other	as	 ‘safe	bets’,	individuals	belonging	to	organizations	that	‘had	paid	their	dues	and	would	continue	to	pay’	for	the	price	of	their	commitment	to	the	M20.65	But	it	was	primarily	in	a	process	of	‘de-assurance’	and	due	to	a	counter	bandwagon	effect	that	internal	conflicts	reached	their	apex.		
‘De-Assurance’,	Counter	Bandwagon	Effect	and	Demoralization		 During	 the	sequences	occurring	 from	February	 to	April	2011,	we	observed	 the	effects	 of	 ‘assurance	 games’	 and	 the	 ‘bandwagon	 effect’:	 the	 process	 started	 by	 the	pioneers	of	 the	M20	—	and	before	 them,	by	 the	pioneers	of	 the	 ‘Arab	Spring’	—	was	gradually	 strengthened,	 thanks	 to	 the	 rallying	 of	 followers	 who	 participated	 in	 the	movement	after	having	witnessed	or	anticipated	its	successes.	Conversely,	the	following	sequences	 were	 marked	 by	 the	 opposite	 phenomenon:	 the	 impression	 that	 the	movement’s	 chances	 for	 success	were	dwindling	 prompted	more	 and	more	 people	 to	jump	off	the	bandwagon.		 First	and	foremost,	the	adoption	of	a	new	constitution	following	July	1st,	2011’s	referendum	dealt	a	very	hard	blow	to	the	supporters	of	 the	February	20th	movement.	After	this	date,	some	individuals	admitted	that	‘the	movement	[had]	lost	its	ability	to	steer	the	debate,	when	faced	with	the	Makhzen’s	war	machine,	whose	sophistication	had	been	underestimated’.66	During	 this	 period,	when	 the	media	 did	 not	 completely	 ignore	 the	M20,	it	was	busy	proclaiming	its	demise	—	even	though	the	movement	was	at	the	time	organizing	 summer	marches	 in	 Casablanca	 that	were	 larger	 than	 ever	 before	 (almost	80,000	protestors,	according	to	the	organizers).		 M20	 supporters	 likewise	 had	 the	 impression	 that	 what	 was	 happening	 at	 the	regional	 and	 international	 levels	 was	 doing	 them	 a	 disservice.	 The	 predominant																																																									65	Interview	with	an	Al	Adl	adherent,	July	2011. 66	Interview	with	a	blogger,	July	2011.	
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international	discourse	touted	the	avenues	 for	reform	proposed	by	the	monarchy	as	a	better	 alternative	 to	 revolutionary	 options.	 The	 European	 Union	 and	 the	 G8	 both	underscored	the	need	to	support	the	‘encouraging	developments’	made	in	countries	such	as	 Morocco.	 Certain	 ‘friends	 of	 the	 king’	 were	 invited	 the	 represent	 the	 country	 at	summer	conferences	on	the	subject	of	Arab	revolutions,	held	at	numerous	universities	across	 Europe.	 In	 addition,	 some	 of	 those	 interviewed	 expressed	 the	 feeling	 that	 the	images	of	civil	war	and	bloody	repression	coming	from	in	Libya	and	Syria,	as	well	as	the	reconstruction	 difficulties	 experienced	 in	 Tunisia	 and	 Egypt,	 deterred	 much	 of	 the	Moroccan	population.		 Little	by	little,	demoralization	gnawed	at	M20	supporters,	even	despite	attempts	to	revitalize	the	movement	and	the	advent	of	new	struggles	which	temporarily	gave	it	new	life	(the	impressive	marches	during	the	summer	nights	of	Ramadan,	the	campaign	to	free	the	M20’s	rapper,	the	boycotting	of	November	2011’s	legislative	elections,	etc.).	As	successes	were	slow	to	trickle	in,	the	feeling	of	living	through	a	historical	turning	point	faded.	Certain	weary	supporters	became	convinced	that	the	‘fossilizing’	practices	of	the	organizations	involved	had	stalled	the	M20’s	momentum	and,	most	importantly,	that	the	struggles	waged	by	the	movement	had	only	benefited	certain	contingents	rather	than	the	population	as	a	whole.		 In	fact,	after	the	referendum	on	July	1st,	 internal	conflicts	peaked	within	M20	in	Casablanca.	These	conflicts	largely	became	public	during	the	general	assemblies	and	on	Facebook;	the	media	was	quick	to	echo	them	in	its	own,	often	distorted	way.	Antagonism	occurred	in	a	wide	variety	of	formats,	including	arguments,	discrediting	attacks,	insults	and	physical	violence	—	which,	despite	being	condemned	by	the	movement,	remained	a	constant	in	Morocco’s	protest	history.	Regardless	of	the	enemy’s	political	identity,	s/he	was	always	accused	of	being	an	agent	of	 the	Makhzen.	 If	 the	tone	no	 longer	sought	 to	smooth	over	 ‘cultural’	differences	between	 ‘Islamists’	and	 ‘leftists’,67	the	main	dividing	line	had	also	significantly	shifted.	PSU	militants	and	‘independents’	demanded	a	‘debate	of	ideas’	and	expected	Al	Adl	supporters	and	the	radical	left-wing	contingent	to	‘reassure	the	middle	classes’	by	clearly	expressing	their	adherence	to	the	parliamentary	monarchy.	On	 the	 contrary,	 the	main	members	of	 the	 ‘hard	 core’	—	Al	Adl	 supporters	and	other	segments	of	the	radical	left-wing	—	refused	to	grant	the	movement	a	‘threshold’	or	limit	
																																																								67	Epithet	used	by	some	‘independents’.		
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and	argued	that	ideological	debates	created	dissension.	They	wanted	to	concentrate	on	what	unified	the	group:	action	on	the	ground.	During	the	same	period,	all	those	pushing	an	alternative	political	 culture	 criticized	 the	 ‘hard	 core’	 for	 continuing	 to	work	 ‘in	 the	shadows’	and	bypassing	the	general	assembly	—	the	main	instrument	of	participatory	democracy	—	even	 though	 the	 ‘baltagis	within’	had	been	neutralized.	More	 than	ever	before,	many	accused	Al	Adl	supporters	of	receiving	orders	 from	the	top	down	and	of	imposing	their	hegemony	on	an	organizational	level,	in	complicity	with	a	segment	of	the	radical	left-wing	contingent.	Mainstream	supporters	saw	signs	of	this	control	in	a	number	of	 details	 and	 incidents:	 notable	 absences	 during	 discussion	 workshops	 led	 by	‘independents’;	 the	calendar	established	for	marches	during	Ramadan;	 the	 fact	 that	Al	Adl	supporters	prevented	young	girls	whose	appearance	they	did	not	like	from	getting	into	the	audio-enabled	vehicles	participating	in	the	demonstrations,	etc.	Some	individuals	even	went	so	far	as	to	identify	a	‘power	grab’	in	their	leader’s	manner	of	walking	during	demonstrations:	‘He	looks	like	the	master	of	the	house	during	a	marriage	ceremony	(mul	
al’ars)’.	Even	more	significantly,	variations	in	the	number	of	protestors	were	interpreted	either	as	a	 ‘boom’	 in	Al	Adl	participation	or	a	 ‘retreat’,	 each	 time	with	 the	 same	goal:	demonstrating	the	group’s	central	position	to	its	adversaries	within	the	core	of	the	M20.	All	 these	 accusations	 were	 rejected	 by	 members	 of	 the	 ‘hard	 core’,	 who	 in	 turn	appropriated	 this	 externally	 imposed	 label	 for	 themselves.	 According	 to	 one	 Al	 Adl	member,	 ‘the	accusations	of	hegemony	[made	by	certain	 left-wing	M20	members]	are	only	 the	 reflection	of	 their	 fear:	 they	have	 seen	 Islamists	win	by	a	 landslide	 in	Libya,	Tunisia,	and	Egypt...’.68		 Shortly	after	the	PJD’s	victory	on	November	25th,	2011	in	the	legislative	elections,	Al	Adl	announced	its	defection	from	the	M20	on	the	national	level.	Some	saw	in	this	act	a	friendly	hand	proffered	towards	their	‘Islamist	brothers’.	Others	argued	it	was	simply	Al	Adl’s	 refusal	 to	 continue	 to	 invest	 in	 a	 coalition	 which	 wanted	 to	 set	 limits	 to	 the	movement.	Beyond	the	official	press	release,	however,	 interviews	revealed	that	Al	Adl	leaders	felt	that	their	‘sacrifices’	had	benefited	the	PJD	and	that	the	population	was	not	‘ready’	yet.	The	defection	of	this	powerful	organization	affected	the	performance	of	the	remaining	M20	contingents	in	Casablanca,	as	well	as	the	coalition’s	recomposition.	
																																																								68	Interview,	November	2011. 
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	 Weekly	demonstrations	 continued	 to	be	held	and	 to	 include	 social	demands	of	varying	specificity.	They	also	periodically	drew	back	to	the	M20	some	activists	who	had	left	 to	 condemn	 the	 movement’s	 ‘radicalization	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 Al	 Adl’.	Nevertheless,	 the	 number	 of	 participants	 dwindled	 woefully.	 Moreover,	 although	 the	organizational	 measures	 originally	 put	 in	 place	 had	 allowed	 marches	 to	 be	 unified,	centrifugal	 forces	 to	 be	 contained	 and	 less	 ideological	 slogans	 to	 be	 favored,	 from	December	25th,	2011	on,	ideological	identities	erupted	onto	the	scene	and	began	to	fight	each	other	for	audio-visual	territory.	This	was	particularly	evident	during	the	march	on	January	1st,	2012.	At	 the	heart	of	 the	official	M20	demonstration,	slogans	and	banners	expressed	left-wing	sentiments	and	photographs	of	leftist	martyrs	from	the	Years	of	Lead	were	numerous	 (cf.	photograph	2).	On	the	 sidelines,	 the	 families	of	 Salafist	prisoners,	surrounded	 by	 members	 from	 the	 Independents’	 Collective,	 began	 to	 chant	 religious	slogans	for	the	first	time	and	to	brandish	a	banner	which	read	‘There	is	no	other	God	than	God	and	Mohammed	is	his	prophet’.	Finally,	on	January	1st,	2012,	the	slogan	‘The	People	Want	the	End	of	the	Regime’	was	first	chanted	via	the	sound-system	on	top	of	the	M20-Casablanca’s	official	vehicle.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Photograph	2.	January	1st,	2012:	March	to	Derb	Ghallef	in	Casablanca	
Revue française de science politique, 2012/5 (vol. 62) 
	 38	
	In	the	foreground,	the	calligraphy	reads	‘There	is	no	other	God	than	God	and	Mohammed	is	his	prophet’	on	a	banner.	In	the	background,	photographs	of	leftist	‘martyrs’.	© Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi 
 	 At	 the	 level	 of	 the	 M20’s	 Casablanca	 headquarters,	 Al	 Adl’s	 defection	 did	 not	inverse	 power	 relations	 between	 ‘independents’	 and	 those	 affiliated	 with	 political	movements,	nor	did	it	serve	to	‘moderate’	the	movement.	On	the	one	hand,	this	defection	was	a	decisive	turning	point	in	the	M20’s	reconfiguration,	which	saw	the	shrinking	of	the	coalition	 around	 the	 core	 of	 the	 radical	 left	wing.	On	 the	 other	hand,	 it	 destroyed	 all	attempts	 at	 self-limitation,	 which	 had	 sought	 to	 preserve	 the	 coalition’s	 unity	 and	 to	maintain	 a	 collection	 of	 demands	 in	 tune	 with	 existing	 power	 relations	 and	circumstances.	In	reality,	thanks	to	their	discipline,	their	organizational	abilities	and	their	capacity	to	mobilize	others,	Al	Adl	supporters	had	been	able	to	hold	the	streets	just	as	well	as	the	‘hard	core’	line.	In	other	words:	they	had	helped	to	channel	the	movement,	and	in	a	certain	way,	to	‘moderate’	it.		 *	*															*		 On	February	21st,	2012,	in	a	Facebook	post,	H.A.	(who	had	contributed	to	drafting	the	M20’s	first	call)	invited	the	movement’s	followers	to	suspend	their	participation:	‘The	dinosaurs	have	transformed	the	M20	into	something	which	is	different	only	in	name	from	other	movements	that	have	failed	in	the	past.	In	new	ways,	they	have	committed	the	same	
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old	errors,	produced	the	same	illusions.	Those	who	say	that	the	movement	is	still	going	strong	are	only	paying	attention	to	labels...’.		 After	a	year	of	blows	exchanged	with	the	authorities,	the	M20	was	left	weakened.	Far	from	being	the	product	of	a	domino	effect,	it	depended	on	a	process	of	identification	and	attribution	of	similarity,	on	the	reactivation	of	organizational	links	and	more	or	less	abeyance	 structures.	 A	 large	 coalition	 brought	 together	 newcomers	 and	 seasoned	militants	within	a	field	of	alliances	and	oppositions	that	was	located	at	the	intersection	between	 institutionalized	 politics	 and	 protest	 space,	 above	 and	 beyond	 the	 cleavages	separating	 Leftists	 from	 Islamists.	 In	 the	 interplay	 between	 internal,	 local,	 national,	regional	and	international	levels,	an	ensemble	of	actions,	interactions	and	events	helped	both	to	anchor	the	coalition	as	well	as	to	hasten	its	disintegration.	The	protests	spread	and	drew	new	energy	from	several	factors:	the	regime’s	reactions;	the	regime’s	quest	to	maintain	its	first-class	position	in	the	region;	the	protestors’	belief	in	their	ability	to	‘win	over’	 the	Makhzen;	 their	 impression	that	 they	were	 living	through	a	historical	 turning	point	 and	 that	 success	was	 imminent;	 the	 triumphs	 that	 helped	 to	 stoke	 the	 fires	 of	participation;	the	measures	implemented	to	maintain	the	coalition	and	mask	particular	identities	and	ideologies.		 As	 for	 the	 coalition’s	 gradual	 disintegration,	 it	 occurred	 both	 visibly	 and	imperceptibly,	in	relation	to	both	intentional	and	non-intentional	interactions.	The	first	defections	 were	 those	 of	 by	 actors	 well	 positioned	 enough	 on	 the	 institutionalized	political	scene	to	hope	to	influence	its	reconfiguration	and	benefit	from	the	reforms	put	in	motion.	At	the	same	time,	infiltration	and	growing	suspicion	regarding	the	‘Makhzen	within’	 blurred	 the	 boundaries	 between	 ‘us’	 and	 ‘them’,	 thus	 halting	 the	 process	 of	polarization.	More	significantly,	acts	of	repression,	the	struggle	waged	against	both	the	internal	 and	 external	 Makhzen	 and	 the	 attempts	 to	 compensate	 for	 defections	encouraged,	at	the	heart	of	the	reconfigured	coalition,	the	hegemony	of	those	endowed	with	the	greatest	militant	capital,	to	the	detriment	of	those	individuals	hoping	to	conduct	politics	 otherwise.	 The	 last	 straw	 came	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 second	 large	 swath	 of	defections,	marked	by	the	departure	of	the	Islamist	organization,	hitherto	considered	the	most	powerful	within	 the	 protest	 space.	 In	 a	 demoralizing	 atmosphere,	 the	 following	perceptions	 arose:	many	 felt	 that	 they	 had	 ‘lost	 the	 battle’	 amid	 a	 deterrent	 regional	climate;	 history	 appeared	 to	 slow	 down;	 the	 feeling	 of	 being	 an	 ‘us’	 unified	 against	adversity	began	to	fade;	the	belief	that	the	fruits	of	participation	were	reaped	only	by	a	
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certain	 contingent	 of	 the	 coalition	 and	 not	 the	whole.	 Each	 time	 that	 new	 defections	robbed	the	M20	of	segments	which	had	helped	to	‘moderate’	or	‘maintain’	the	coalition,	the	 process	 of	 radicalization	was	magnified	within	 a	 group	 increasingly	 composed	 of	individuals	who	saw	no	alternative	to	occupying	the	streets.	 In	 the	case	observed,	 the	‘structural	uncertainty’	 inherent	 to	situations	of	political	 fluidity	was	rapidly	offset	by	self-limitation,	 both	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 authorities	 as	 well	 as	 the	 protest	 movement,	dominated	by	‘organized’	actors,	wary	of	disturbances	and	excesses	and	proud	of	their	ability	to	control	the	streets	and	aware	of	the	strategic	scope	of	each	of	their	actions.	The	process	 of	 radicalization	 was	 consequently	 more	 fostered	 by	 the	 movement	 getting	weaker	 than	by	 its	 strength,	or	by	 the	overwhelming	of	 its	pioneers	by	unpredictable	followers.		 During	February	2012,	hotbeds	of	protest	and	dissent	began	to	develop	outside	of	the	M20,	taking	different	forms:	an	increase	in	sectorial	demonstrations,	the	wide-spread	adoption	 of	 the	 slogan	 ‘Get	Out!’;	 outbursts	of	 violence	which	 demonstrated	 just	 how	precarious	of	an	option	self-limitation	was;	 the	 ‘quiet	encroachment	of	 the	ordinary’69	marked	by	the	conquest	of	urban	spaces	by	street	vendors	and	the	increasing	number	of	lodgings	built	with	no	attention	paid	to	city	regulations.	At	the	very	moment	when	the	M20’s	 organization	 began	 to	 falter,	 its	 main	 pillars	 realized	 that	 they	 had	 opened	 a	Pandora’s	box.	One	man	in	charge	of	the	security	forces	confessed	to	us70	that	‘nothing	will	 ever	 be	 the	 same	 again,	 citizens	 no	 longer	 have	 the	 same	 relationship	 with	 the	authorities’.71	
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																																																								69	Asef	Bayat,	Street	Politics.	Poor	People	Movements	in	Iran,	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997.	70	Interview,	February	2012.	71	We	would	like	to	thank	the	members	of	Casablanca’s	M20	for	the	warm	welcome	we	received.	We	would	also	like	to	thank	Philippe	Blanchard,	Dina	El	Khawaga,	Olivier	Fillieule,	Choukri	Hmed	and	the	reviewers	of	this	journal	for	their	stimulating	comments. 
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